Other SOF forces, even when their resources are being cut, have realized that specialist aircraft and aircrew are vital to SOF capabilities. Lack of resources undercut German antiterrorist deployments, including those of the Border Police’s GSG 9 (Grenzschutzgruppe 9), contributing to the decision to call off a potential rescue attempt on a hijacked ship off Somalia in 2009. Germany’s lack of SOF-capable helicopters has also limited its KSK (Kommando Spezialkräfte, special operations command, organized in 1996) in operations in Afghanistan. Its requirement for new SOF helicopters will not be met until at least 2015-16.

As well as ongoing combat operations in the Caucasus and against Somali pirate hostage-takers, Russia’s SOF continues to exercise with the special warfare forces of SOCOM, as well as those from former Soviet nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Russia has moved to return organizational control of its seven Spetsnaz brigades from the Ground Forces to the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).  In addition, Russia is investing in specialized SOF air support capabilities, including some 20 modified Mi-8AMTSh “Hip” helicopters, and some Il-76 “Candid” transports with a night vision goggle flight capability. Russia aims to eventually establish a joint-service special operations command as an operational headquarters. High-ranking officers of the general staff and the GRU had pushed for such a command to be established since 2008, although Anatoly Serdyukov, the previous defense minister, was reluctant to go ahead. Since October 2012, the current defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, has moved to create this command and increase joint SOF training above that already taking place in recent years. The new command will have operational control of one or two Spetsnaz brigades. One of the powerful motivating factors for creating joint structures for Russian SOF has been the mission of security for the upcoming 2014 Sochi Olympics. The Russian press has identified the challenge of bringing together the following entities for this task: “Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU [Spetsnaz]); the Interior Ministry’s police special-purpose detachments; the border guards’ ‘operational support sections’; the Internal Troops’ TsSN (Spetsnaz); the FSB’s TsSN, with its Alfa and Vympel [units]; and even the Foreign Intelligence Service’s own Spetsnaz.”

China has been building up its SOF since the 1990s, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) emphasizing forces that could be used to overcome Taiwan’s defenses in a conventional conflict, and with internal security forces that have counterterrorism missions. PLA SOF stress heliborne and amphibious mobility. Chinese writings have also pointed out that “small-sized,” “agile,” and “versatile” capabilities have become the basic orientation of PLA development.

India’s defense ministry has also been looking at the potential for a joint SOF command, though the army, which wants to retain full control of parachute and commando units for battlefield missions, has resisted this move. Meanwhile, the Indian Navy’s Marcos (Marine Commandos) reportedly modeled themselves after the U.S. Navy’s SEALs. The Indian Air Force’s Garud unit is trained for direct attack of enemy airbases, and India is also investing in the mobility equipment SOF requires, such as C-130J transports and the amphibious warfare ship INS Jalashwa, though they have not yet procured specialized aircraft, manned or unmanned, to support SOF missions.

China has been building up its SOF since the 1990s, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) emphasizing forces that could be used to overcome Taiwan’s defenses in a conventional conflict, and with internal security forces that have counterterrorism missions. PLA SOF stress heliborne and amphibious mobility. Chinese writings have also pointed out that “small-sized,” “agile,” and “versatile” capabilities have become the basic orientation of PLA development. Neighbor North Korea’s SOF, like its ballistic missiles and long-range artillery, are a pillar of its ability to strike deep, beyond the Demilitarized Zone. The importance of SOF to North Korea was underlined on March 4, 2013, when Gen. Kim Yong Chol, chief of the Reconnaissance Bureau, gave a rare public speech about “ever more powerful and real” threats.

Afghanistan has made progress in re-creating a SOF capability that dates back to the 1960s. In 2012, in addition to working with ISAF SOF, an Afghan National Army (ANA) SOF platoon was operating independently in Khost. Four platoons were then available for operations nationwide. The Joint Special Unit (JSU), formed in 2009, includes both army and police personnel and has operated in 34 of Afghanistan’s provinces, integrated with ISAF SOF. It is, however, dependent on the United States for helicopter mobility. The JSU has made a priority of avoiding collateral damage.

 

Challenges

The economic crisis and the winding down of commitments in Afghanistan have motivated large-scale cuts in defense spending. While SOF have been preserved from the worst of the first-round cuts in countries such as Britain and France, as well as the United States, they will not escape the more painful impact likely to be seen in the near future.  SOF cannot operate without other forces, both operationally and as part of the larger force structure, from which SOF units and capabilities are assembled. Cuts in force structure will mean that SOF will be asked to do more but will have fewer resources to turn to for support. In addition, the low-quantity, high-cost equipment associated with SOF, such as specialized helicopters and their highly trained crews, communications, and sensors, is increasingly difficult to afford. SOF is expensive, in terms of training as well as equipment, and expecting results without investment is unrealistic. However, compared to other investments – NATO estimates a 110-man SOF company could be equipped for 13 million euros – the return in terms of capabilities across the spectrum of conflict is likely to remain compelling.

“Special operations today is a networked force that cannot be effective without these strong linkages to other organizations and other national special operations forces,” McRaven said in 2012. As a rear admiral commanding U.S. SOF in Europe, he demonstrated this notion by being willing to put American SOF units under coalition commanders in Afghanistan. The United States has, during his career, influenced worldwide SOF while becoming a global force itself, aiming to encourage partners able to carry out missions as part of coalitions. For NATO, the NSHQ is a way to ensure that the alliance-wide standards and shared understanding that enabled the coalition air campaigns against Kosovo and Libya and which have been honed in Afghanistan are applied to SOF communities worldwide. Other major powers – Russia, China, and India among them – will continue to invest in SOF and their capabilities. The innovations seen in the United States and NATO over the past decades, such as the creation of joint SOF commands and the recognition of the need for specialized air and naval mobility assets, may be followed by these countries for their own reasons. Even outside U.S. and NATO influence, the importance of increasing SOF capabilities is being recognized.

To hear writer David C. Isby discuss this article and the issues it covers with The Year in Special Operations Consulting Editor John D. Gresham, listen in June 17, 2013 at 1:00 EST on internet radio at: http://www.blogtalkradio.com/writestream/2013/06/17/military-monday-with-john-d-gresham. If you miss it, you will later be able to download the show.

This article was first published in The Year in Special Operations: 2012-2013 Edition.