In the Middle East, the main driver is probably the continuing threat posed by Iran, which often threatens to use submarines, small fast combatants, and mines to close the vital Straits of Hormuz to oil shipping. Iran is also developing ballistic missiles that can hit the entire Middle East, and is nearly universally believed to be developing an atomic bomb suitable for those missiles. Several countries with active naval programs changed government during the Arab Spring. To the extent that the Arab Spring put the needs of the population ahead of those of the military (which had buttressed the previous regime), it seems likely that military and naval spending will be cut dramatically in favor of urgently needed public spending. Egypt is probably the main case in point. The question will be whether the new governments will feel that foreign threats (usually perceived as Iran and Israel) require that previous spending levels be maintained. In the event of drastic cuts, it seems more likely that naval than ground forces will suffer, because the latter will be perceived as instruments to maintain public order. Particularly in Egypt, the new popular governments are finding it difficult to meet public expectations. Saudi Arabia is largely immune from this force because it has not yet experienced an Arab Spring revolt, and because its resources are so huge that it appears to be able to avoid painful choices, at least for now.

The largest navy in the area is that of Saudi Arabia. Announced Saudi programs include a sea-based ballistic missile defense capability (inspired by the U.S. naval ballistic missile defense program) and (a much lower priority) up to four diesel-electric submarines (presumably to counter the Iranian craft). The ballistic missile defense program was reflected in this year’s Euronaval show, when one builder (Fincantieri) displayed a model of a ballistic missile defense surface combatant equipped with the U.S. Aegis system. Up to five ships may be involved, the most likely candidate being the Arleigh Burke class. The Saudis have also shown interest in the fast U.S. littoral combat ship, and at Euronaval Lockheed Martin displayed an enlarged version carrying Aegis. Other navies in the area are building new larger corvettes, but nothing so spectacular.

In April the Indian Navy took delivery of a leased Russian Akula class nuclear attack submarine, with another on the way. The submarine was named Chakra II in memory of a Russian nuclear submarine previously leased to India, and returned in 1991. Meanwhile India is building a nuclear submarine (to be armed with, among other things, ballistic missiles), christened Arihant.

The Israeli navy has concentrated on buying German-built Dolphin-class submarines, which are now being presented as a deterrent to the Iranians, possibly armed with cruise missiles (a third submarine of the current [second] series was ordered this year). The first of the series, Tannin, was delivered in May. As it is generally believed that Israel has a substantial nuclear arsenal, and as the Iranians would find it impossible to deal with the submarines at sea, the hints of deterrence seem credible. Note, however, that the missile in question has never been identified; the United States, for example, never sold Tomahawk to Israel. Meanwhile a projected Israeli frigate program (at one time transmuted into a program to buy a large amphibious ship) has stalled, the Israeli navy apparently being unable to decide just what it wants.

 

Far East

In Asia, Indian naval modernization continues, with Russian-built submarines being fitted to fire land- and ship-attack cruise missiles, while the Indians are building French Scorpene-class submarines as replacements. Other Indian submarines are to be modified to fire U.S. Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The Indian navy is buying both locally built destroyers and frigates and Russian-built frigates – and it is also continuing both its domestic carrier and domestic nuclear submarine programs.

In April the Indian Navy took delivery of a leased Russian Akula class nuclear attack submarine, with another on the way. The submarine was named Chakra II in memory of a Russian nuclear submarine previously leased to India, and returned in 1991. Meanwhile India is building a nuclear submarine (to be armed with, among other things, ballistic missiles), christened Arihant.

To the extent that the Chinese writings stressing the need to safeguard access to raw material reflect actual Chinese thinking, they provide regional navies with a way to apply pressure: They can threaten that access, probably most effectively using submarines. This possibility may well explain the growth in local submarine forces, in many cases in navies that had never previously operated submarines – such as those of Malaysia (French-built Scorpenes) and Vietnam (Russian-built Kilos).

South Korea’s growing strength not only as a naval power but also as a shipbuilder is reflected in a recent order from Indonesia for three Type 209/1400 submarines, the German-designed type that has been built for some years for the Korean navy. In winning the contract, Daewoo defeated French, German, Turkish, and Russian builders; note that the Turkish vessels would also have been German-designed submarines. The first of the three will be built in South Korea, the others in Indonesia (the first with many Korean-built components). Reportedly a key advantage of the Korean offer was technology transfer to Indonesia, which would mean the transfer of technology originally transferred from Germany to Korea. Korea is currently building Aegis destroyers, and this fall announced that it would extend the program from the original three hulls to six. The current Korean plan calls for a total of 18 modern destroyers, including the Aegis ships. The Koreans have already built helicopter assault carriers (Dokdo has been completed, and three others are building), and a fleet like this one could well be envisaged as escorts for a true carrier, perhaps with STOVL aircraft. As it is, Dokdo is as large as the existing Spanish STOVL carrier, and the Koreans are considering buying the STOVL version of the F-35 to equip it. The current Korean plan is to deploy two or three “rapid response fleets,” each consisting of one carrier (Dokdo-type), two Aegis destroyers, five other destroyers, two or three submarines, and possibly some frigates. It is not clear how the current non-nuclear submarines would be integrated into such formations.

Increased Chinese naval activity and the escalating tension over the South China Sea have convinced Japan to authorize a larger fleet, the first increase being in submarines (the current 22-boat force is to grow to 24). The 24-boat force would provide two task groups, one facing south into the East China Sea and one facing east into the Sea of Japan.

However, the great question is when and whether Japan moves from the current large “helicopter destroyers” to true carriers equipped with STOVL or even conventional aircraft – with the announcement of the current 19,000-ton ships pointing that way.

To the extent that the Chinese writings stressing the need to safeguard access to raw material reflect actual Chinese thinking, they provide regional navies with a way to apply pressure: They can threaten that access, probably most effectively using submarines. This possibility may well explain the growth in local submarine forces, in many cases in navies that had never previously operated submarines – such as those of Malaysia (French-built Scorpenes) and Vietnam (Russian-built Kilos).

China surely also explains the Australian decision to double the size of the current submarine force. The obvious point at which pressure can be applied is the funnel of the Malacca Straits, through which ships pass en route from the Middle East to Chinese ports. Chinese interest in Burmese ports (and in modern roads through Burma) may also be explainable in these terms: the Chinese may hope to unload ships before they have to pass through the choke point of the straits.

This story was first published in Defense: Winter 2013 Edition.