The Navy, however, favored the Northrop/McDonnell Douglas development of the twin-engined YF-17. It didn’t want the V-1600, nor any of the other proposals based on the F-16. Most accounts state that a primary reason for rejection of the F-16 was that the Navy preferred its aircraft to have two engines, because of the added over-water safety factor. Some say the Navy thought there was more growth potential in a scaled-up YF-17, and that it had superior range to the F-16. Others have brought up the fact that the F-16’s jet intake was just above the nosewheel, posing a greater than usual hazard for the catapult crew, but apparently these were not the only reasons, or the most important.

In his book Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation, former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. James L. Holloway explained how he fought for the F/A-18 the Navy preferred. Holloway wrote that he had already fought members of Congress who wanted to force the F-16 on the Navy: “I had testified that the Navy wasn’t interested in a fighter that could only get on and off of a carrier by means of a crane, no matter how little it costs.”

Meanwhile, the Air Force wanted their F-16 to remain a lightweight, no-frills fighter, in part due to a perceived threat to the F-15 Eagle program. Remember that the “Fighter Mafia” had fought tooth and nail to keep the F-16 lightweight and simple, and that meant no BVR capability.

The Navy under CNO Holloway had already begun to develop the Northrop YF-17. The concept would evolve into the F/A-18, a larger version of the YF-17 suitable for carrier operations, with a beyond visual range (BVR) capability embodied in Sparrow III missiles mated to a medium-range radar. According to Aircraft Carriers at War, however, the Office of the Secretary of Defense under James Schlesinger was still determined to force a navalized F-16 on the Navy.

Meanwhile, the Air Force wanted their F-16 to remain a lightweight, no-frills fighter, in part due to a perceived threat to the F-15 Eagle program. Remember that the “Fighter Mafia” had fought tooth and nail to keep the F-16 lightweight and simple, and that meant no BVR capability. Holloway even recounts an incident where Secretary of the Air Force John McLucas loudly declared to him in the E Ring of the Pentagon – “Admiral, the Air Force is the program manager for the F-16, and I can promise you we are not going to screw up the design and performance by adding a lot of stuff that the Navy wants. It’s an Air Force lightweight fighter, and we are going to keep it that.”

Holloway appealed directly to Schlesinger for a meeting to explain the Navy’s position. The admiral was told he could bring only two other people to the meeting because of the size of the room, but when he walked into Schlesinger’s office that day in April 1975 he found more than a dozen people from OSD, who proceeded to argue at length for their preferred F-16-based choice.

When Holloway’s turn finally came, he explained first that “… naval test analyses indicated the F-16 would bang the tailpipe on the deck with unacceptable frequency,” during carrier landings, and even a cursory look at the geometry of the main gear lends credence to those analyses. OSD personnel countered with the claim that the problem could be solved with faster landing speeds and better pilot technique (preach that to the naval aviator landing on a dark and stormy night, with the deck pitching 20 feet or more), and then went on to make even more lengthy arguments for the F-16.

After the meeting had adjourned, Schlesinger called Holloway into his inner office and told him the Navy would get the F-18. On May 2, 1975, OSD announced “the Navy had DOD approval to develop the F-18 for production.”

Holloway, however, had saved his best argument for last.

“I pointed out that the F-16 carried only AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and they were clear-air-mass missiles. In clouds, a radar missile like the AIM-7 Sparrow III was required. This capability, with the necessary radar guidance system and heavier pylons, had been incorporated into the F-18 design, but the F-16 would not accommodate an all-weather missile system without extensive redesign and added weight.” The V-1600’s increased size and weight, even in a paper proposal, clearly demonstrated this.

After the meeting had adjourned, Schlesinger called Holloway into his inner office and told him the Navy would get the F-18. On May 2, 1975, OSD announced “the Navy had DOD approval to develop the F-18 for production.”

And that was the end of the naval F-16 and the beginning of nearly 40 years of U.S. Navy Hornet operations, from F/A-18A/B/C/D Hornets, to F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, and then EA-18G Growlers. The Air Force’s F-16 would eventually gain Sparrow capability, and then, even better, AMRAAM capability, but by this time it had evolved from the simple, lightweight day fighter originally envisioned into a true multi-role aircraft. Each service got the aircraft they wanted, at least from the choices available, to serve their unique needs, and for each service the aircraft became a success story. Perhaps there’s a lesson in there.