In the 1950s and 1960s the U.S. Navy’s emphasis was on fast carrier strike forces. And since these carrier strike forces were so fast, the Navy thought, rightly or wrongly, that these forces could outrun Soviet submarines that might pose a risk. Add to that the emerging Soviet threat from ship and submarine-fired surface-to-surface cruise missiles, and the U.S. Navy made a reasoned calculation to invest substantially in missile defense against Soviet aircraft and missiles. And while the Navy did not completely abandon guns for fleet air defense, to be effective against increasingly speedy missiles and aircraft, these guns had to combine high muzzle velocity with high rates of fire. Unfortunately, the threat vastly outclassed the ability of gun technology to be even modestly effective.

It is important to understand the magnitude of the U.S. Navy’s challenge to defend a fast-aircraft carrier-focused Navy against air, surface, and subsurface threats. The Navy’s CONOPS – or concept of operations – was to operate not just single, but multiple, fast-aircraft carrier strike groups. And the word fast is important here, because in a conventionally powered Navy, going fast over sustained periods burned enormous quantities of fuel, which required a substantial refueling and replenishment force, with itself was even more vulnerable to enemy attack from the air, and thus generated its own substantial air-defense needs. Viewed through this lens, it is easy to see why fielding large numbers of different kinds of defensive missiles rapidly (and having them vie with each other in a best-of-breed competition) was viewed as a compelling need.

The U.S. Navy stepped up to meet this need with alacrity. Building on successful late-war and post-World War II tests of defensive missiles under Operation Bumblebee, the Navy entered the 1950s working on several experimental designs, with Typhon, Talos, Terrier, Tartar and several others competing for prominence – and funding.

Importantly, at this stage of the game, with memories of World War II and the twin threats of Germany’s buzz bombs and Japan’s Kamikazes still on the minds of missile developers, the strong focus of their efforts were on the missiles themselves and not on the systems surrounding a missile: fire control hardware and software and all else that was needed to make the missile itself as effective as possible. As we will see later, the lessons learned in pursuing this focus would prove invaluable in fleet air defense missile development throughout the 20^th century.

 

Taking on the Challenge – The Players

Finally, while this segment has addressed the “what,” the “why,” and the “how,” regarding the way in which the U.S. Navy began to deal with the compelling challenge of fleet air defense, it has not addressed the “who,” with respect to those doing the development of these missiles. While the U.S. Navy writ large was at the center of this effort, other players in this effort are important, and some of them remain intimately involved in missile defense – and especially ballistic missile defense – today.

The overarching effort was driven by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), which laid out operational requirements and which ultimately had to communicate and defend those requirements to the Department of Defense and Congress. But the acquisition of these missiles was directed by the Navy’s “Bureaus,” which represented the Navy’s technical arms. Responsible to the Secretary of the Navy, these Bureaus took OPNAV’s requirements and worked with industry and others to produce what the Navy needed.

Fleet air defense development was especially complex, because responsibility for this function resided in several bureaus. Since missiles could be thought of as pilotless aircraft, the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), needed to be involved. But since they were weapons, the Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd), needed to be involved. And since search radars were required to find the threat, the Bureau of Ships (BuShips), which was responsible for search radars, also needed to be involved. Even with the best possible professional working relationships, this did complicate matters.

And this effort was not all focused completely within U.S. Navy lifelines. In addition to the U.S. Navy two important organizations – the Operational Evaluation Group (OEG), which later became the core of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) of Johns Hopkins University – were, and remain, key players in this field. But the stage was set to get fleet air defense into the Navy Fleet with urgency.