At the “corporate” level, Latin American drug cartels have become highly sophisticated and technologically savvy. The use of a simple fishing boat to smuggle millions of dollars in drugs – and humans – is cost-effective in an environment where a high-tech approach using speed boats would attract more attention and mean a greater loss if scuttled.
“The technologies I see them using most effectively are satellite phones and some counter-surveillance capabilities,” stated Camp. “The transportation side is like an express delivery company – they take products from a lot of different organizations, put them in the panga and head north, with GPS and a sat-phone. But those are very low-profile vessels and remarkably hard to spot. If you are in a C-130 [Hercules] and you don’t have an appropriate sensor package, you won’t see a panga.”
The partnership with Latin American countries is important and appreciated in this operation, especially given the level of violence from the cartels faced by personnel at all levels of law enforcement and government, and their families.
“Mexico takes care of the operation south of the border, including fixed-wing aircraft flights. At my level, our relationship with Mexico is superb and they are willing partners,” Camp said. “A lot of nations to the south, including Honduras, Nicaragua, and Colombia, work with us as well.”
But fighting smugglers is like pushing on a water balloon – push in one place, it bulges out at another.
“I don’t think what we’re learning is specific to the U.S. southern border; the universal truth is the enemy is extremely flexible and well financed. We should not be worried about matching them dollar for dollar, especially with the budgets we see coming. We have to fight with innovation, increased intel resources, and our modernized and incredibly capable new assets such as the national security cutters, upgraded helicopters, and faster, more capable patrol boats,” Camp said. “It sounds like a cliché, but it really is a case of fighting smarter, not harder.”
There is a cautious approach to any declarations of success, since this is a war that will continue as long as there is a profitable demand for the smugglers’ goods and services. Even traditional law enforcement measures of success must be weighed against the latest intelligence.
At the fiscal year’s midpoint, thanks to the refined, coordinated enforcement of the Pacific Southwest border, the 11th District had already more than doubled the amount of marijuana disrupted or seized to date compared to the previous two years combined. The increase could be due to the changes made to the patrols, or an overall increase in the flow of contraband, or both. Intelligence analysts will answer that question, among others, as the “war offshore” goes on.
As for the near future, Operation Tempestad will continue, with modifications as needed to meet the ever-changing threat. While expansion could improve it, there is little likelihood of that in an era of increasingly austere federal budgets. Nonetheless, it is a battle the Coast Guard and its partners will continue to fight as a real-world component of national security, from counter-smuggling to counterterrorism.
“Our position is, if you let these organizations ply the waters off California to bring in marijuana, you are also allowing criminal infrastructure to develop for the movement of all types of contraband and even terrorist activity,” Camp said. “We simply cannot, and will not, permit that to happen.”
This article was first published in Coast Guard Outlook: Summer 2012 Edition.