Incredible Victory: The Battle of Midway

Even before the Battle of the Coral Sea, FRUPAC had begun to pick up traces of information about another Japanese offensive, this one headed their way in the central Pacific. Called Operation MI, it appeared to be the largest single operation ever undertaken by the Imperial Fleet, with virtually every ship and submarine taking part. Through some very clever analysis and a little trickery, FRUPAC managed to piece together the MI plan, and informed Nimitz of the target and planned execution date: Midway Atoll and early June. The Japanese would muster 11 battleships, eight aircraft carriers, and more than 100 other warships, submarines, and transports to move across the Pacific and take and occupy the northernmost base in the Hawaiian chain – clearly a challenge for the U.S. Navy to come out and fight.

Nimitz had no illusions about what would happen if he attempted to face Yamamoto’s force head-on. There would be a short and ugly battle, with America being driven out of the central Pacific and possibly forcing the evacuation of Pearl Harbor. Short of ships, especially after the loss of the Lexington at Coral Sea, the Pacific Fleet was down to just three operable aircraft carriers (Enterprise, Hornet, and the damaged Yorktown) and a few dozen cruisers, destroyers, and submarines to oppose the Japanese onslaught.

However, Nimitz had one key advantage over Yamamoto: He knew exactly what the MI operation was planned to accomplish, where and when it would happen, how it was organized, and even what ships were assigned to the various Japanese battle groups. Best of all, the Japanese had no idea that FRUPAC had broken into JN-25 and that the MI plan had been thoroughly compromised. MI revolved around the idea that the Japanese would have the same kind of surprise at Midway as at Pearl Harbor, and that the American fleet would be in harbor. Clearly there were flaws inherent in the MI plan, some of which could be exploited by Nimitz and his carrier commanders if his forces could be assembled in time to meet Operation MI in early June. Realizing that there was opportunity as well as danger in the coming Japanese assault, Nimitz rolled the dice. However, he carefully loaded them in his own favor.

Nimitz had one key advantage over Yamamoto: He knew exactly what the MI operation was planned to accomplish, where and when it would happen, how it was organized, and even what ships were assigned to the various Japanese battle groups.

First, Nimitz ordered all three U.S. carrier groups back to Pearl Harbor, having made sure that they were seen by Japanese reconnaissance planes in the South Pacific prior to their return. He then began a quick but thorough reinforcement of Midway Atoll, remembering how effective the Marines at Wake had been the previous December. Along with the ground forces, he sent PT boats and aircraft to protect the tiny atoll, and set up a cordon of American submarines to the northwest and northeast. Finally, he had his staff study the intercepted MI operations plan, which by now had been almost totally decoded by the FRUPAC codebreakers.

Seeing that the Japanese were throwing their forces in piecemeal in their complex plan, and using almost half of their strength in diversions and reserve forces that were going to be well back from Midway itself, he decided to try to ambush the Japanese Kido Butai (literally mobile unit or force) carrier group. Commanded by Nagumo, this was the same unit that had devastated Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941. The mobile force normally would have been composed of six big aircraft carriers, two fast battleships, a pair of heavy cruisers, and about a dozen other escorts. Crucially, however, the Coral Sea battle had left Shokaku badly damaged and Zuikaku with a depleted air group. Both would be out of action for several months, reducing the Japanese task force’s striking power by a third.

In contrast, Nimitz ordered Yorktown into drydock at Pearl Harbor for 72 hours to have the worst of her damage patched and her aircraft losses made good by standby replacements. Joining the rest of Task Force 17 under Fletcher, Yorktown was sent out in time to meet up with Enterprise and Hornet at a rendezvous northeast of Midway, aptly named “Point Luck.” All three of the U.S. carrier air groups had been reinforced with new-model F4F-4 Wildcat fighters, and the three American flattops would have almost as many planes as Nagumo’s four. Combined with the land-based aircraft on Midway, Nimitz’s forces would actually have a small numerical advantage over Kido Butai if the Japanese showed up as scheduled on June 4.

 

Not everything went in Nimitz’s favor, however. He lost the services of Halsey when the carrier commander came down with a severe skin inflammation that required hospitalization. On Halsey’s recommendation, Nimitz elevated Spruance to command of Task Force 16 (whose cruisers and destroyers he had commanded previously) and ordered him to take the two-carrier force out to meet up with Fletcher’s Task Force 17. Also, not all the reinforcements sent to Midway were of the highest caliber. Many of the aircraft were obsolete fighters and dive-bombers such as the Brewster F2A Buffalo and Vought SB2U Vindicator, and the aircrews were as green as their planes were outdated. Nevertheless, Nimitz gambled wisely, with the final touch being that he would remain at Pearl Harbor, rather than go out with the fleet. This would allow him to send updates and messages to his carrier commanders while they concentrated on fighting their battle. In contrast, Yamamoto was riding aboard his flagship, the super battleship Yamato, several hundred miles behind his carrier force, where radio blackout rules would leave him mute until the battle began.

The Battle of Midway opened early on June 3, when the Japanese diversion force in the Aleutians bombed Dutch Harbor, Alaska, and began to occupy the small islands of Attu and Kiska. However, all this did was give Nimitz further confidence in the FRUPAC estimate of the MI operational plan, which had predicted the diversion, and he ordered his units to get ready. One lesson from Coral Sea that the Americans were able to take advantage of at Midway was extensive use of land-based reconnaissance aircraft. More than 30 Navy PBY Catalina flying boats based on Midway made daily patrols out to 700 miles, covering an entire day’s transit distance by Japanese surface forces. On the evening of June 3, a PBY from Midway discovered the MI invasion force, which was attacked by Army B-17s and Navy PBYs armed with aerial torpedoes. One tanker was torpedoed, though only slightly damaged. It was clear, though, that sometime the next morning, the largest naval engagement in U.S. history was going to take place.

While the Japanese carriers worked to finish arming, fueling, and preparing to move their strike to the flight decks, 151 American aircraft were shortly to arrive above the Japanese fleet.

June 4, 1942, was a beautiful day in the central Pacific, with the weather front that had been northwest of Midway breaking up. As it did, the ships of Kido Butai emerged and launched an air strike against Midway to begin the pre-invasion bombardment. As more than 100 Japanese bombers and fighters flew toward Midway, a pair of PBYs sighted the attack force, and then Kido Butai itself. While Midway scrambled its small force of fighters to intercept the incoming air strike, dozens of bombers took off to attack the Japanese carrier force.

The Japanese struck first, hitting Midway with a heavy air strike. While their superb A6M2 “Zero” fighters shredded the elderly Marine fighters, the “Vals” and B5N2 “Kates” proceeded to drop their bombs.

However, a number of Japanese aircraft had been lost or damaged, and the leader of Nagumo’s returning strike radioed that they had met an unexpected level of resistance and another strike would be needed to subdue Midway. Though Nagumo had been ordered by Yamamoto to hold half his planes back – armed with torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs – for an attack on any American carriers, he decided to rearm those reserve aircraft for a second strike against the atoll. This meant removing the anti-ship ordnance from the aircraft and loading bombs that were more effective against ground targets.

In the meantime, the island had launched a series of airstrikes of its own – from Air Force B-17s and torpedo-carrying B-26s to Marine SBD Dauntlesses and obsolescent SB2U Vindicators – against Nagumo’s carriers. While the strikes achieved no damage against Kido Butai, they were pressed home with determination and kept the combat air patrols (CAP) of Zeros busy and the carriers maneuvering to avoid the attacks. This slowed the intricate work of rearming aircraft in the hangar decks, and kept the carriers from being able to head into wind for much longer than it took to recover and recycle their CAP aircraft. Rearming a full deckload strike of aircraft could take up to an hour and a half even under ideal conditions, and spotting the aircraft on deck could take another 45 minutes or more, as the Type 99 Aichi D3A Vals were bombed-up on the flight deck itself. On top of this, the Zeros in the CAP had to be refueled and rearmed after engaging the American aircraft attacking from Midway, and more launched in order to keep an umbrella of air cover over the fleet.

Meanwhile, the Japanese aircraft that had flown the first strike on Midway, low on fuel, some damaged and with wounded aboard, would soon need to land and be struck below to the hangar decks to be refueled and rearmed.

At approximately 0745, Nagumo received the message that Tone‘s scout plane reported sighting an American fleet. Shocked, he now reversed the order to rearm his planes for a second strike on Midway. The Kate torpedo bombers were to be reloaded with torpedoes and the Val dive-bombers with armor-piercing bombs for use against ships. Some of his advisers urged an immediate strike on the American fleet with whatever weapons were already hung on the aircraft. He decided instead to land and refuel his CAP aircraft as well as his returning strike aircraft while the rearming was being done, and to launch one big strike assembled from all his carriers.

In the mad rush to rearm, torpedoes, bombs and ammunition were left on the hangar decks, and aircraft were also being fueled. At 0820 Tone‘s scout radioed that it had spotted an American carrier. Nagumo’s decision had already been made, and anyway, rearming was proceeding, and the returning strike aircraft had all landed by 0920. However, it would take time to finish the rearming already underway, rearm the newly recovered strike aircraft, move them up to the flight decks, and spot them for launch.

It would take time Nagumo no longer had.

While the Japanese carriers worked to finish arming, fueling, and preparing to move their strike to the flight decks, 151 American aircraft were shortly to arrive above the Japanese fleet.

Between 0700 and 0755, Spruance’s Enterprise and Hornet had begun launching aircraft at extreme range, hoping to catch the Japanese in exactly the position they had found themselves. At this range, the squadrons did not have enough fuel to circle around and form up properly for coordinated strikes, and individual squadrons departed on individual courses to seek out the Japanese fleet. Aboard Yorktown, Fletcher launched later, between 0838 and 0906, and managed to send a more coordinated strike.

Coordination was important because it split the defenders. This was especially important to the torpedo squadrons flying the obsolescent Douglas TBD Devastators. Lt. Cmdr. John C. Waldron’s Torpedo 8 was the only squadron from Hornet to find the enemy that day, but it found the carriers first, around 0920, just as the last of Nagumo’s Midway strike aircraft were trapping aboard.

Waldron was under no illusions as to VT-8’s chances without fighter escort, and even before launching told his pilots that if only one of them was left, he expected that pilot to get a hit. The TBDs came in low and slow, locked into their runs just above the wavetops as the combat air patrol of Zeros scythed into them and every gun in the Japanese fleet that could bear opened up. The Zeros came in again and again, and one by one the Devastators went in, too low to bail out and too fast to ditch. Only a few dropped their torpedoes, none of them scored hits, and only one pilot, Ensign George Gay, survived.

Rearming and refueling proceeded as quickly as was possible aboard the Japanese carriers as they heeled over into sharp evasive turns to avoid the attacks, but soon Lt. Cmdr. Eugene E. Lindsey’s Torpedo 6 arrived and steadied into their runs. This time, seven managed to drop their “fish,” but again they got no hits, and only four aircraft survived to recover aboard Enterprise. Even as the carriers recovered from this attack, Lt. Cmdr. Lance E. Massey’s Torpedo 3 bore in. This time, Cmdr. John S. Thach’s Wildcats were there to take on the CAP of Zeros, but they were vastly outnumbered, and enough Zeros remained to cut the TBDs to pieces. Five of Torpedo 3’s Devastators launched, all missed, two returned to their carrier. All three torpedo squadrons had taken devastating losses and failed to make a single effective hit. But it was somewhere in the middle of Torpedo 3’s attack that the Dauntless dive-bombers arrived.

The two squadrons from Hornet failed to find the Japanese forces. The two Enterprise squadrons were similarly unable to initially find their targets, but their leader, Cmdr. Clarence “Wade” McClusky, was made of sterner stuff. Following a Japanese destroyer that had been chasing down an American submarine, McClusky led his two squadrons of SBDs north. At the same time, Lt. Cmdr. Maxwell “Max” Leslie was leading a squadron of dive-bombers from Yorktown straight at Kido Butai. At 9:34 a.m., the three squadrons of SBDs converged over the Japanese task force and began their attacks.

Thanks to the previous attacks depleting the Japanese CAP, the SBDs had little or no opposition as they began near-vertical dives on three of the Japanese flattops. Most of the Enterprise dive-bombers followed McClusky down onto Kaga, hitting her with so many bombs that she was nearly ripped apart. The five remaining Enterprise SBDs followed Lt. Cmdr. Richard “Dick” Best onto Akagi, hitting her twice and starting devastating fires. Leslie was just as good, leading his Yorktown SBDs onto Soryu, and mortally wounding her. All the exposed ordnance and fuel lines fed the flames, sealing the fate of the three carriers and Japan’s ambitions. In just five amazing minutes, the entire course of the Pacific War had changed.

However, Rear Adm. Tamon Yamaguchi aggressively fought the one remaining Japanese carrier, the Hiryu. Launching a pair of air strikes at the Yorktown, his Vals and Kates crippled the American flattop, leaving her abandoned and drifting by the end of the day. However, Fletcher had sent out a search from Yorktown before the Japanese air strikes, and they found Hiryu in the afternoon. Over on Enterprise and Hornet, Spruance scraped together all the SBDs he could, including some refugees from Yorktown, and sent them after Hiryu. Once again, the Americans caught the Japanese launching, with a final air strike spotted on the deck of Hiryu when the SBDs bombed. Fatally hit, Hiryu would soon join the other three Japanese flattops on the bottom of the Pacific. Though the Americans had lost almost half of their airplanes and had Yorktown crippled, they had just won the most decisive naval victory since Trafalgar, and the battle was not over yet.

For a while after his carriers were hit, Yamamoto tried to hold Operation MI together. That evening, the Japanese commander tried to ambush Task Force 16 with a night engagement, but the wily Spruance backed out of the trap. Within a few hours, Yamamoto canceled Operation MI, ordering the bulk of his forces to withdraw behind a screen of cruisers. On June 6, SBDs from Enterprise and Hornet sank the heavy cruiser Mikuma and badly damaged her sister, Mogami, as they tried to withdraw. The curtain fell on the Battle of Midway the next day when the Japanese submarine I-168 torpedoed and sank the crippled Yorktown and the destroyer Hammann (DD 412) as the carrier was being towed home to Pearl Harbor.

With the victory at Midway, Nimitz completed one of the great reversals of fortune in military history. In just six months and with little reinforcement, he led the Pacific Fleet to blunt the greatest overwater invasion in military history, and retook the initiative for the United States and its allies. Within two months, American Marines would take the offensive and land on Guadalcanal to begin the fight that would start the Allies on the road to Tokyo Bay.

 

This article first appeared in the The 70th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor.