Of course, these opportunities bring several potential difficulties. An increase in resource extraction and ship traffic increases the risk of spills, and the overall potential for more pollution. Alaska Natives are concerned that the problems associated with increased traffic may threaten their food supply. The lack of roads in the Alaskan interior means food shipments arrive by boat or plane, which increases prices; much of the native diet is provided through fishing or subsistence hunts for seals, walrus, whales, caribou, and waterfowl, which may be killed or displaced by human activity. Shell’s endeavor to drill the first exploratory oil wells on Alaska’s Outer Continental Shelf in two decades was launched conditionally: The company pledged to stop drilling when necessary to avoid interrupting native hunts for bowhead whale.
Another problem associated with melting Arctic ice is that it actually makes travel more dangerous: In many cases, ice refreezes in large, irregular chunks that present further hazards to navigation, and without a large ice cap, the wind whips up larger ocean waves.
After suffering a series of setbacks that prevented it from executing any of its planned exploratory drilling in the summer of 2012, Shell became acquainted with the difficulties presented by the harshness and remoteness of Alaskan waters: In late December, its drilling ship Kulluk, which had been working in the Beaufort Sea, encountered stormy seas while being towed back to its winter home in Seattle, Wash. On Dec. 31, with winds gusting to nearly 70 miles per hour and swells of up to 40 feet, incident commanders were forced to disengage the rig’s last remaining tow line in order to protect the crew aboard the tow vessel, and the Kulluk promptly grounded just offshore of Sitkalidak Island, an uninhabited island within the Kodiak Island archipelago.
A week later, as salvage crews refloated and towed the Kulluk to anchor in the more sheltered Kiliuda Bay, the rig’s reinforced hull – containing about 143,000 gallons of diesel fuel and 12,000 gallons of lubricant oil and hydraulic fluid – remained intact.
The outcome of the Kulluk incident could have been much worse, especially if it hadn’t occurred about 40 miles southwest of Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak. Service personnel were able to respond relatively quickly to the troubled Kulluk and tow vessel, evacuating the rig’s 18 crewmembers with rescue hoists from an MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter. Senior leaders from Coast Guard Sector Anchorage – chief among them Capt. Paul Mehler, the sector’s commander and federal on-scene coordinator for the incident – helped protect the tow vessel crew’s lives by ordering the last tow line cut, and Rear Adm. Thomas Ostebo, commander of the 17th Coast Guard District, was the first senior federal officer to visit the site of the grounded rig. In the end, the incident occurred without injury, loss of life, or adverse environmental impact.
The Kulluk incident brought into stark relief some of the questions the U.S. government, and the Coast Guard, have been asking themselves: What if such an incident had happened when the Kulluk was in the Beaufort Sea, 1,000 miles north of the nearest Coast Guard air station? How would the Coast Guard have responded? How will the Coast Guard position itself to prepare for such contingencies – which seem almost inevitable, given the increased activity in the Arctic?
An Arctic Strategy
On Aug. 6, 2012, when Adm. Bob Papp, commandant of the Coast Guard, appeared before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, he pointed out that the Coast Guard has been at work in Alaska since 1867, when the United States first purchased the Alaska territory from Russia. The Revenue Cutter USS Bear frequented Port Clarence, just north of Nome, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries: escorting whalers; interdicting poachers and smugglers; taking censuses of people and ships; rescuing shipwrecked sailors; and recording tidal, geological, and astronomical information. For decades, however, the Coast Guard’s presence in the Arctic was minimal, apart from the service’s manning of a long range navigation radio transmitter maintained at Port Clarence from 1961 to 2010.
The Coast Guard and other federal maritime officials are working to adapt to the changing conditions in the Arctic, adopting a strategy that looks at both the short and long terms – recognizing the need for detailed study of how existing Arctic assets can be adapted and enhanced while also recognizing that increased human activity already requires a greater Coast Guard presence. “The imperative for expanded Coast Guard capabilities in the Arctic,” said Papp in his February 2012 State of the Coast Guard Address, “is now, not 20 years from now.”
The greatest near-term challenge to expanded Arctic operations is the lack of infrastructure, which presents a daunting supply chain dilemma: The nearest deep-draft port is Dutch Harbor, in the Aleutian Island chain, about 1,200 nautical miles from the North Slope. Aircraft flying from Kodiak, the nearest air station, must travel 900 miles to reach Barrow – the community that, because of its size and strategic location between the Chukchi and Beaufort seas, has become the focal point for Coast Guard operations.
Despite its advantages, Barrow lacks the shore-based infrastructure necessary to sustain operations: There are no ports, no air stations, nor radio towers or other communications infrastructure, and no facilities capable of permanently housing personnel. This lack of infrastructure, Papp has pointed out, requires that in the short term, Coast Guard operations in the region will be expeditionary: surging assets forward into the Arctic, and then recalling them as the ice begins to cling again to the shore of the North Slope.
The most recent and most ambitious operation in the region, Operation Arctic Shield 2012 (AS12), marked the first time the Coast Guard has sustained a multi-mission presence throughout the Arctic maritime season, from July to November. The Coast Guard’s 17th District established a seasonal air base in Barrow, stationing two Kodiak-based Jayhawks in a rented hangar. Air and support crews bunked and ate in a decommissioned distant early warning line facility – a Cold War-era radar station built to scan for Soviet bombers coming over the Arctic Circle.
Arctic Shield’s surface assets were led by the national security cutter Bertholf, which has state-of-the-art command, control, and communications systems, along with the ability to launch and recover helicopters and cutterboats. The Bertholf, serving as a mobile base of operations, was supplemented by two light ice-capable seagoing buoy tenders, a high endurance cutter, and a medium endurance cutter.
AS12 was a resounding success, overcoming the lack of infrastructure, logistical challenges, and the tyranny of distance. The operation validated the Coast Guard’s operational proof of concept and the use of mobile command and control platforms, as well as seasonal air and communication capabilities through leased or deployable assets and facilities. It also validated that the current suite of Coast Guard assets provides appropriate agility to meet near-term mission demands. Lessons learned and the experience gained during AS12 will be applied to refine and improve Coast Guard Arctic operations and presence for the near future, with a weather eye to providing strategic long-term presence in the region.
Safely operating in the challenging Arctic maritime environment, far from Coast Guard bases and other infrastructure, requires careful risk management. Long-term success requires collaboration with industry, academia, environmental groups, Native tribes, other nations, and state and local governments, as well as other stakeholders to acquire and apply best practices to manage risks. The Coast Guard understands the need to foster domestic and international partnerships to increase coordination, enhance efficiency, and reduce risk. Mutually beneficial relationships with and among international, interagency, state, local, tribal, and other nongovernmental partners are essential for mission success.
Though many questions about the Coast Guard’s presence in the Arctic remain to be answered within the next several years, one thing is certain: The service will be there, carrying out all its statutory missions. “This is going to be a very exciting place for the United States Coast Guard,” said Ostebo, “a very meaningful place for the American people and our nation as we look forward to remaining a maritime power. It’s an incredible opportunity, and an incredible responsibility – and it’s all playing out in the next five to 10 years.”
This article first appeared in the Coast Guard Outlook 2013 Edition.