Helicopter Progress

U.S. Marine Corps aviators flew history’s first mass helicopter resupply operation on Sept. 13, 1951. Newly arrived squadron HMR-161 did the honors. Known as Windmill I, and making use of the squadron’s Sikorsky HRS-1s, the operation involved airlifting one day’s supplies to the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, which was attacking on Hill 673 northward along a ridge system. On September 21, HMR-161 carried Marines into battle, the first helicopter squadron to deploy troops into combat.

Given the limited size of the F-86 Sabre screen, the inadequacy of the F-84 Thunderjet as an escort, and a host of other factors, the B-29 could not survive against the MiG.

In October 1951, outnumbered Sabres prowled MiG Alley and the greatest air battles of the war took place over northwestern Korea. Now, the MiG-15 force had increased to 525 aircraft, confronting 44 F-86 Sabres. On Oct. 23, 1951, as B-29 Superfortresses went after targets in North Korea, a hundred MiGs boxed in the 34 Sabres of the screening force. The Sabres shot down two MiGs, but this was no comfort to eight Superfort crews, escorted by 55 newly introduced F-84 Thunderjets. No fewer than 50 MiGs swarmed over this bomber force, inflicting critical damage. This was the last B-29 Superfortress daylight mission for months. Given the limited size of the F-86 Sabre screen, the inadequacy of the F-84 Thunderjet as an escort, and a host of other factors, the B-29 could not survive against the MiG. Nor was an escort of British-built Meteor jets flown by Australian pilots any help: the Meteor F.Mk. 8 performed well on air-to-ground missions but was outclassed by the MiG.

When Gen. Mark W. Clark replaced Ridgway in May 1952, there were about 800 MiGs on one side, and 100 Sabres on the other. That month, Col. Harrison Thyng, the 4th Wing commander, became the 16th U.S. ace of the war. Thyng was already an ace from a previous war and could easily have gotten more MiGs, but he was known for “handing over” opportunities to bag a MiG to younger pilots who flew on his wing. Many view Thyng as one of the great leaders of the air war, a man who frequently challenged the generals and the Pentagon brass to provide the equipment and weaponry he needed to subdue the MiGs.

The hard-wing F-86F came to rule the skies. Sabre pilots, once outnumbered and outgunned, now commanded the aerial battlefield.

Also in August 1952 came the most important event since F-86 Sabre pilots began to wrest the advantage away from their adversaries over MiG Alley. That month, the 51st Wing at Suwon flew its first combat missions with three F-86F Sabres with solid wing leading edges. The “hard-wing” F-86F was the final evolution of a design that had shown extraordinary promise (with the F-86A), had been developed to improve its maneuverability (F-86E), and had finally canceled out the altitude advantage enjoyed by the MiG (with the slat-wing F-86F). The hard-wing F-86F came to rule the skies. Sabre pilots, once outnumbered and outgunned, now commanded the aerial battlefield.

On Nov. 4, 1952, Dwight D. “Ike” Eisenhower took 55 percent of the popular vote and 422 of 531 electoral votes, based in part on a promise to go to Korea. Peace talks were stalled; not good news for Ike, who wanted to get the war off Americans’ minds by ending it as quickly as possible.

American leaders would win an armistice in Korea only by offering the strongest opponent of an armistice – South Korea – something in return. The quid pro quo was the U.S.-South Korean defense treaty of 1954, which committed the United States formally to the defense of the ROK.

Ultimately, American leaders would win an armistice in Korea only by offering the strongest opponent of an armistice – South Korea – something in return. The quid pro quo was the U.S.-South Korean defense treaty of 1954, which committed the United States formally to the defense of the ROK.

In January 1953, the communist air armada confronting United Nations forces in Korea totaled 1,485 aircraft, including 950 MiG-15s, 165 propeller-driven fighters, 100 Ilyushin Il-28 twin-jet bombers, and 270 other types. On Feb. 16, 1953, 1st Lt. Joseph M. McConnell, Jr., of the 39th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS)/51st Fighter Interceptor Wing (FIW), shot down his fifth MiG. Because of a delay in confirmation, McConnell became the 27th ace of the war. Capt. Manuel J. “Pete” Fernandez, Jr., of the 334th FIS/4th FIW, was recognized as the 26th ace when he claimed his fifth and sixth kills on Feb. 18. The two men would later compete for top honors and be joined in the contest by second-tour Maj. James Jabara. At war’s end, the top three aces were McConnell (16 kills), Jabara (15), and Fernandez (14.5).

On April 11, 1953, truce negotiators at Panmunjom followed through on Clark’s proposal, and the response of communist leaders, by reaching a tentative agreement for the two sides to exchange seriously ill and wounded prisoners of war.

In the air-to-air fighting, the Sabre now commanded the sky. In less than two years, the Sabre pilot had gone from underdog to victor. Once outnumbered and outflown, he was no longer seriously challenged.

On May 10, 1953, night-fighting F-94Bs toted up their first MiG kill. Capt. John R. Phillips was the pilot and 1st Lt. Billy J. Atto the radar observer.

In the air-to-air fighting, the Sabre now commanded the sky. In less than two years, the Sabre pilot had gone from underdog to victor. Once outnumbered and outflown, he was no longer seriously challenged.

 

Closing Actions

On July 22, 1953, F-86 Sabre pilot 1st Lt. Sam P. Young of the 51st Wing racked up the final MiG kill of the Korean War.

It is important to remember that the armistice was inked by the commanders of the armies in the field – the United Nations Command, the (North) Korean People’s Army, and the Chinese People’s Volunteers. No government has ever signed it and no peace agreement has ever been reached.

When the cease-fire was signed at 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 1953, by Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., and Gen. Nam Il, it was to become effective 12 hours later at 10:00 p.m. It is important to remember that the armistice was inked by the commanders of the armies in the field – the United Nations Command, the (North) Korean People’s Army, and the Chinese People’s Volunteers. No government has ever signed it and no peace agreement has ever been reached.

In the Korean War, the U.S. Air Force lost 971 aircraft. Most of these (671) were caused by ground fire, though a substantial number (206) were claimed by other causes. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps lost 1,033 aircraft to all causes. The U.S. Air Force flew 392,139 combat sorties (including 57,665 for close air support) and the U.S. Navy 126,874 (65,748 for close air support). Communist figures for losses and sorties are not available, but according to American numbers, the other side lost 600 MiGs in air-to-air combat, with another 143 listed as probably destroyed. Many years after the war, a study by the U.S. Air Force, code named Sabre Measure Charlie, downgraded the F-86 Sabre-versus-MiG-15 “kill ratio” from more than 14-to-1 to a revised figure of 7-to-1. The latter figure remains the best achievement in any fighter campaign in history prior to Operation Desert Storm.

Many years after the war, a study by the U.S. Air Force, code named Sabre Measure Charlie, downgraded the F-86 Sabre-versus-MiG-15 “kill ratio” from more than 14-to-1 to a revised figure of 7-to-1. The latter figure remains the best achievement in any fighter campaign in history prior to Operation Desert Storm.

Because of what came later in Vietnam, we often forget that the Korean War was a success. Although it was not done quickly or easily, and certainly not without terrible cost not merely in dollars but in blood, the Korean War halted aggression against South Korea and assured the survival of the country that had been attacked. In its aerial phase, the war brought innovations from the jet engine to the helicopter, and all of them arrived to stay.

This article was first published in The Forgotten War: 60th Anniversary of the Korean War.