Nice shots, I think the German TIGER tank was a year after this and it was a winner

The Grants and Lees served their purpose at a time when they were really needed. No one was going to call them great tanks, but they were a nasty surprise to the Germans in the Western Desert and that was what was important.

The Tiger was a great defensive tank, but it was always underpowered, which contributed to unreliability, and lacked mobility. Of the “iron triangle” – mobility, protection, firepower – the Tiger sacrificed the first in order to have the latter two qualities.

and was thirsty as well

Absolutely right on that, too, Ann.

Howdy,
I’m sorry, but this seems a rather shallow and pathetic piece of work.
I was hoping to learn something, but I can’t let this pass.

Yes American tanks were critical to Britain winning North Africa, since their own tanks were so limited; in fact as I’ve often said, the main difference between Montgomery and the previous British Commanders, is that he had Detroit on his side, and they didn’t

You have ignored the most important part of the story of the M-3 Medium; which is that it was created in the summer of 1940, and was always intended to be an interim tank before the US could make 66″ turret rings to mount 75mm guns, and only began production shortly before Churchill’s letter, in late March-April of 1941.
The gun you criticize so much was the only one available, which you seem to be unaware of.
It wasn’t low velocity (especially by British or then German standards) as its initial reputation as a tank killer demonstrates, but initial ammunition was lower velocity than later types, in part because of general concerns regarding recoil (which also afflicted the M-4), and a few month’s later the same tanks were using higher velocity ammunition (15-30% faster), and later often the same ammunition as the usually longer gunned Sherman tank (by the way some early Sherman’s carried the shorter M-3 Medium’s gun; 28 vs 37 calibers).
You didn’t criticize the machine guns, turret, or engines, etc; which were also designed to last much longer than a tank in combat should expect, yet you don’t mention its highly praised reliability.
Initially, there were so few transmissions, that the various manufacturing companies shipped the couple that were available between them for the demonstrations to the press in April 1941, to show that everything was fine when it obviously wasn’t. Eventually some things were sorted out, but the first M-3 Mediums didn’t reach Egypt until December 1941, too late to make a very significant difference in Operation Crusader.
It’s profound reliability was the basis for the M-4 Sherman, not to mention the 64″ turret ring Canadian Ram tank as well, which was armed with a 6 pounder gun long before the Brits managed to mount one in their own tanks.
The desert campaign in 1942 was one of considerable flux as newer tanks were introduced quickly, rendering tactical advantages like like the M-3 Medium’s very temporary, when Panzer Mk IV ‘specials’ arrived, followed by M-4 Sherman’s that summer and Tigers that fall in Tunisia after Operation Torch.
By the way the Tiger was fatally flawed since production was limited to 50-60 per month for all of Germany, totaling barely 1350 MBT’s for two years of effort, in trying to defend fronts exceeding 1600 miles in breadth.

Almost 6300 M-3 Medium’s were built in about 20 month’s before being largely phased out of production in December 1942 by Chrysler etc (some of the smaller companies’ limited production apparently lasted into 1943). Some versions were riveted, but others were welded from the beginning and predated the riveted models, but guess which saw combat first?

It indeed continued to serve in combat throughout the war with our allies, being shifted to India-Burma in late 1943 onwards, along with some 900 going to the Australians to use in New Guinea and Borneo, after M-4 Sherman production had caught up with european theater demands; where the exhausted Japanese had little to resist them.
Meanwhile any Russian unit that had M-3’s was grateful to have them, taking care to keep them in service as long as possible.

But I’m very curious where you came up with the idea the US, which was building both a huge navy and huge merchant marine, built almost THREE times as many tanks as the soviets during the entire war, when in fact they actually barely outproduced the USA?

The fact that that your post has not had these facts corrected in the last two weeks is appalling. My interest is this site has been considerably diminished, as a result.

How can we criticize the lame-stream media for their colossal ignorance in military or historical matters to mention just two, when someone who should know better gets so much wrong?

While I’ve been disappointed in what I’ve read so far, I always hope to see improvement.

I know we all have bad days, but our work shouldn’t reflect any personal failings.

Looking forward to better reports,

L

Welcome and thanks for the comment. I think the fact that your comment has a higher word count than the original post speaks to much of what you complain about, since when a writer has a limited word count allotted to him, details are going to be lost in the interests of describing the big picture. But it’s obvious you’re a fan of the M3, and why not? It’s unusual in configuration among World War II tanks that fought more than a couple of months or so (Char B, I’m talking to you), and of course Bogart commanded one in Sahara, so it received star billing in at least one film.

First, I agree with you on Montgomery. Both Wavell and the Auk, were, in my opinion, superior generals, not to mention superior human beings, but they were essentially in the wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong orders or a lack of resources that crippled their efforts. But that’s another story.

Second, good catch on the 29, 956 number, which is a production figure covering only Soviet light tanks, although the paragraph in your comment compares the US to the USA. I assume you meant UK. In any case, our figure will be corrected, since it doesn’t include the all-important mediums like the T-34 and T-34/85, or the SP guns. Add those in, and you’re looking at more than 62,000 additional tanks for the production figure over the entire war.

Notwithstanding that, in 1943 the U.S. produced nearly double the entire Soviet production in that peak year. The U.S. also produced more than 100,000 AFVs during the war, if you want to count half-tracks, etc., which the U.S. Army certainly did. Slightly less than the Soviets’ claimed totals, but about three times what the UK produced. And regarding Soviet totals, I think Stalin taught us all to take those with a grain of salt.

As to ignoring the most important part of the story, as you put it, that the M3s were intended as interim tanks, the story clearly states that the M3 was a transitional design, though some of the details of why that was so could not be included due to space considerations.

With regard to the M2 75mm gun, at the moment in time covered in the story it was a great weapon, but today’s writers have the benefit of history and hindsight. In the Western Desert, as stated, it was a rude shock to the Germans, outranging everything they had other than the Mk. IV special’s L48 75mm and the 88mm in the anti-tank role. What you point out, however, is really a matter of perspective. There is no reason to malign the Grant/Lee’s 75 mm at that point in the war. It had a better muzzle velocity at 2,050 fps than the Mk. IV’s standard 75mm gun at 1,263 fps, for example. On the other hand, the British Matilda’s 2-pounder main gun, admittedly essentially a 40mm, had a muzzle velocity of 2,650 fps. But far from being unaware of the fact that the M2 75 mm gun was the only one available at the time, we are well aware that it was the only one available to most American tankers THROUGHOUT the war. The Mk. IV special’s 75 mm had a muzzle velocity of 2,481 fps, almost double the earlier generation German 75 mm. The Panther’s 75mm gun had a muzzle velocity of 3,068 fps. The T-34/85’s larger 85mm fired at 2,600 fps, and the Tiger’s 88mm had a muzzle velocity slightly higher than the Soviet 85 mm. So you can understand the inclination to speak of the M2 75mm as low velocity when viewed from the perspective of the entire war. While other armies moved on and upgunned as well as uparmored their tanks, the U.S. only belatedly adopted the 76mm for some of the later Shermans and of course the 90 mm for the Pershing. But it was too little, too late. See Belton Cooper, Death Traps for a personal look at the results of these decisions, as one example.

The reliability of U.S. tanks in World War II is well known. While that aspect was not within the scope of the article it certainly had something to do with the British interest in U.S. tanks throughout the war, reliability not being a strong suit of British tanks of the era. Again, reliability over the long term was not the main subject of the article, but rather the British need for tanks and their initial effect on the war in the desert.