A Cemented Role Amid Latin American Unrest

Despite SOUTHCOM’s elevation of status under the Kennedy administration, over the next decade, senior administration and military leaders, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, considered disestablishing SOUTHCOM in an effort to reduce America’s military footprint around the globe. At one point, SOUTHCOM was downgraded to a three-star command status, and its various service component commands were eliminated. By the mid-1970s, SOUTHCOM’s mission set was being rapidly drawn down, limited mostly to defense of the Panama Canal, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and contingency planning. Actual forces assigned to the command were always limited, and personnel and assets frequently had to be borrowed from other regional commands to fulfill specific missions. Despite this, SOUTHCOM was a busy and vital place to be assigned during the Cold War, especially with regard to the threat of national or regional insurgencies in civil wars.

For Panama, the most notable event of the ’70s was the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties by U.S. President James E. “Jimmy” Carter and Panamanian Chief of Government Gen. Omar Torrijos in 1977, which arranged for the handover of the canal to Panama in 2000.

For Panama, the most notable event of the ’70s was the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties by U.S. President James E. “Jimmy” Carter and Panamanian Chief of Government Gen. Omar Torrijos in 1977, which arranged for the handover of the canal to Panama in 2000. Implementation began in October 1979, but elsewhere in the region, less peaceful events were taking place. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista uprising began in July 1979, and in October, a civil war began in El Salvador between the civil-military government backed by the United States and a coalition of five leftist guerrilla groups. Around the same time, cocaine cartels began their rise in Colombia as well as in the mountainous regions of Peru and Bolivia. Peru was also combating the rise of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) communist insurgency.

By the early 1980s, the combined importance of these developments removed any remaining thoughts of standing down SOUTHCOM. The Reagan administration, in fact, decided early on to revitalize military influence in the region, and in October 1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated a new Unified Command Plan that restored SOUTHCOM to a four-star billet. They further enhanced the command’s authority by restoring responsibility for contingency planning of Cold War operations in Latin America. The Joint Chiefs also added a new mission of conducting contingency planning for counternarcotics activities, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief was reduced to a secondary mission. Finally, the service chiefs also reactivated major subordinate commands as SOUTHCOM components. It was an important restoration of prestige, responsibility, and authority for the command. Along with an increase in military assistance, training and exercises accelerated. In 1985 alone, SOUTHCOM participated in 13 joint training exercises with Latin American militaries. Highlighting the move toward counterinsurgency in 1986, the United States activated Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) to organize and conduct special operations in the theater. U.S. troops also acted as peacekeepers in the region as Nicaragua’s civil war spilled over into Honduras, and in March 1987, 3,200 U.S. troops were deployed to stabilize the border between the two countries.

Along with an increase in military assistance, training and exercises accelerated. In 1985 alone, SOUTHCOM participated in 13 joint training exercises with Latin American militaries.

While SOUTHCOM was not tested with any large contingency operations in the early 1980s, it was not immune from those operations run by other regional commands. In particular, LANTCOM had run Operation Urgent Fury into Grenada in 1983. The operation was significant in that it exposed a number of weaknesses in the existing Unified Command Plan as well as multiservice (“joint”) command, control, communications, and intelligence operations.

Taken together with failed missions such as Operation Eagle Claw (Iran, 1980) and the casualties taken from the barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon (1982 to 1984), these issues began by the mid-1980s to drive a movement in the Congress for reform of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military. The result was the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reform Act (1986) and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment (1987), which reorganized the way America would go to war into the next century.

As part of the defense reforms enacted by Congress, SOUTHCOM was redefined as a Unified Combatant Command (UCC), which enhanced operational flexibility and the ability to influence regional policy in Latin America, as well as granting more autonomy in new systems procurements by the DoD.

As part of the defense reforms enacted by Congress, SOUTHCOM was redefined as a Unified Combatant Command (UCC), which enhanced operational flexibility and the ability to influence regional policy in Latin America, as well as granting more autonomy in new systems procurements by the DoD. These reforms came at an opportune time, as a problem in Central America reached crisis proportions: Gen. Manuel Noriega in Panama. Once a strong ally of the United States in the region, by the late 1980s, Noriega had become deeply corrupt and supportive of the narcotics trade moving up from South America. He also had become quite hostile toward the United States, requesting and receiving military aid from Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya. In light of the upcoming transfer of the Panama Canal to Panamanian control, the U.S. government began to view Noriega as both a criminal and a threat to American interests. When he was indicted by the U.S. Justice Department for narcotics trafficking, the already sour relationship between America and Panama became hostile.

In 1989, Noriega began to actively harass U.S. military and civilian personnel in the Canal Zone, causing the new American president, George H.W. Bush, and his administration to develop contingency plans for a possible invasion of Panama and the removal of Noriega from office. A new SOUTHCOM commander, Gen. Maxwell R. Thurman, U.S. Army, was assigned to complete the planning and execute the operation if required. During 1989, the command expanded its counter-drug operations throughout the region, but the situation in Panama only worsened. By late 1989, conditions had grown so dire that Bush finally ordered the execution of Operation Just Cause, and on Dec. 20, 1989, combat forces of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Army rapidly took over Panama. Though initially the fighting was intense, overall casualties on both sides were light. Noriega was taken into custody for trial and eventual incarceration for his drug trafficking.

Just Cause was the largest operation to date by SOUTHCOM, in the first test of the new operational rules set down by Goldwater-Nichols. It provided important lessons for future operations, including operations by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) against Iraq in Southwest Asia. SOUTHCOM now was an equal to the other U.S. combatant commands in standing, if not in funding, ready to take its place in future post-Cold War military operations.