SOCOM officials said the CST and FTT efforts were an extension of the “Five Truths” the command states on its website:

1. Humans are more important than hardware. People – not equipment – make the critical difference. The right people, highly trained and working as a team, will accomplish the mission with the equipment available. On the other hand, the best equipment in the world cannot compensate for a lack of the right people.
2. Quality is better than quantity. A small number of people, carefully selected, well trained and well led, are preferable to larger numbers of troops, some of whom may not be up to the task.
3. Special operations forces (SOF) cannot be mass-produced. It takes years to train operational units to the level of proficiency needed to accomplish difficult and specialized SOF missions. Intense training – both in SOF schools and units – is required to integrate competent individuals into fully capable units. This process cannot be hastened without degrading ultimate capability.
4. Competent special operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur. Creation of competent, fully mission-capable units takes time. Employment of fully capable special operations capability on short notice requires highly trained and constantly available SOF units in peacetime.
5. Most special operations require non-SOF assistance. The operational effectiveness of deployed forces cannot be, and never has been, achieved without being enabled by joint service partners. The support of Air Force, Army, Marine, and Navy engineers, technicians, intelligence analysts, and the numerous other professions who contribute to SOF have substantially increased SOF capabilities and effectiveness throughout the world.In 2011, SOCOM and its components launched efforts to update equipment, performance, and capabilities across a wide range of weapons, vehicles, and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. How those will fare under the new budget – despite its favorable treatment of nearly all things SOF – remains to be seen, but in terms of a pre-budget 2011 year in review, senior officials outlined what they ultimately want to enhance special ops.

Among those were:

• A SOCOM request for information for a notional “Kibosh” 40 mm Low Velocity Non-Lethal Delivery System(LVNLDS) for use on a wide range of grenade launchers. With a firing range from 150 to 300 feet, according to the request for information, it would dispense at least 90 percent of a liquid or gas payload into a vehicle, vessel, or room without fully penetrating the space or harming the individuals inside.
• Flatter trajectory rounds to provide increased energy and extreme range accuracy for 7.62 mm, .300 Winchester Magnum, .338-caliber, and .50-caliber sniper systems.
• An integrated sound suppressor “with no reduction in barrel/suppressor life.”
• Weapons signature reduction (IR/thermal) “that is adaptable to transitional environments” and reductions in barrel temperature (IR signature), vibration (accuracy and recoil), and weight.
• A “simple, reliable, inexpensive time delay timer” (mechanical or electrical).
• A man-portable – and optionally airborne – organic precision strike system capable of a “catastrophic kill” against enemy personnel in moving or stationary open, light structures and vehicles at ranges from 6 to 15 kilometers.
• Two indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts, awarded in September 2011, for the design, build, delivery,  and testing of a replacement for the SEALs’ two-decade-old 11-meter Special Warfare Rigid Inflatable Boats.

Changes of leadership also marked 2011, at SOCOM and half its service components. That began on June 24 at AFSOC, as Lt. Gen. Eric Fiel replaced retiring Lt. Gen. Donny Wurster. NSWC followed suit on June 30 when Rear Adm. Edward Winters III transferred command to Rear Adm. Sean A. Pybus. On Aug. 8, the first SEAL to lead SOCOM, Adm. Eric T. Olson, turned the joint command over to another SEAL, Adm. William H. McRaven.