Despite these problems, SOF units assigned to OIF prevailed. U.S., British, and Australian SOF units rapidly cleared the western third of Iraq. Though they failed to locate any WMDs, SOF forces under Mulholland captured airfields, bridges, and critical infrastructure. In the south, U.S. Navy SEALs, Polish GROM commandos, and British Royal Marines took oil platforms, the Faw Peninsula, and the channel to the vital port of Um-Qasr in just a single night. From Kuwait, SF teams flooded into southern Iraq, seizing bridges and airfields, linking up with friendly Iraqis, and conducting special reconnaissance.

But SOF’s best performance came in the north, where the Turkish vote of March 1 had turned the situation on the ground into a potential nightmare. Then-Col. Charles Cleveland, commander of the 10th SFG, had to find a way to keep 16 Iraqi divisions north of Baghdad from attacking the Kurdish zone or heading south to help defend the enemy capital. Taking advantage of SOF’s newly acquired DoD authority, Cleveland, as commander of Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (C/JSOTF-N – Task Force Viking) would command the entire northern Iraq area of operations. His three SF battalions would receive conventional reinforcements, including the 173rd Airborne Brigade and tanks from 1st Armored Division flown in on USAF transports.

With massive air support from USAF heavy bombers and U.S. Navy fighters, Cleveland launched an offensive to occupy the oil production center of Kirkuk. Using small SF teams to lead Kurdish Peshmerga militia bands, this offensive succeeded beyond all expectations. Mosul and Kirkuk were liberated without any damage to the oil production infrastructure, and Iraqi forces were mauled by SF/Peshmerga teams. Using a lethal combination of airpower, new Javelin anti-tank missiles, and light vehicles, Task Force Viking fought a series of brilliant small-unit actions.

The surrender of Baghdad came in early April. SOF units had accomplished everything asked of them and more. Their flexibility, mobility, and growing lethality derived from modern weapons and precision airpower overcame the loss of Turkish access and infiltration opportunities early in OIF. As OIF transitioned from combat to stability operations in late April, SOF units took on new roles, especially the SF and civil affairs (CA) units with critical language and cultural skills. As the occupation turned into a complex protracted insurgency, SOF units and personnel proved uniquely effective.

SOF professionals helped to capture Saddam Hussein and eliminated al Qaeda chief Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. SOF units led the retaking of major cities like Fallujah and Najaf when al Qaeda and Shiite insurgents tried to seize control in 2004. SOF units also led efforts to rebuild the infrastructure of Iraq, ravaged by three decades of Saddam’s neglect and mismanagement. Iraq, as one senior SOF leader put it in 2003, became a “Snake-eater’s Ball” for special operators, and a “flytrap” for global terrorists.

 

New Capabilities and Expansion

While fighting the global war on terrorism (GWOT) over the past decade, SOCOM also grew and transformed under the leadership of two commanders: Holland (October 2000 to October 2003) and his successor, Gen. Bryan “Doug” Brown, USA, (October 2003 to July 2007). Both made considerable use of SOCOM’s unique Title 10 funding line in the defense budget, which allowed the command to procure a variety of weapons and systems.

Along with weapons and platforms, SOCOM has also taken on its most difficult task of the GWOT thus far: growth. The first five years of the GWOT showed the shortcomings of the pre-Sept. 11 SOCOM unit structure, especially with regard to certain key types of units. In particular, there has been a strong need for additional SOF aviation capacity, along with an unceasing requirement for additional SF and SEAL teams. Thanks to these requirements being validated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, SOCOM was given authority to significantly increase the size of its personnel base by 2013. This includes five new active-duty SF battalions, enlarging the 160th SOAR, increased SEAL recruiting, and enlarging the various SOCOM component schools to accommodate the expanding personnel base, which now finally includes Marines.

For many years, Marine Corps leaders resisted the assignment of Marines to SOCOM, seeing it as a diversion of scarce resources from traditional Marine missions. This attitude has gradually changed, with a growing appreciation of the skills that Marines can bring to SOF missions. In October 2005, the Secretary of Defense directed the formation of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) as the Marine component of SOCOM. The Marines initially formed a unit of approximately 2,500 built around a special operations regiment of three battalions, which have focused on the foreign internal defense mission.

Despite the global conflict with terrorism, SOCOM has continued to supply teams for the Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs in more than 90 countries. SOCOM also supports continuing fights against narco-terrorists and human trafficking. Twenty years after the battle on Capitol Hill to create SOCOM, its value to the nation has been fully validated in both war and peace. Far from being just the administrative container for a diverse collection of SOF units, SOCOM is now the de facto leader in the continuing war against violent extremists, and in many ways the cutting edge of U.S. military power.

Even before 9/11, SOCOM and intelligence professionals had been hunting the elusive leader of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. In 2010, a lead obtained from an intercepted mobile phone call began the final lap in the hunt. It ended on May 1, 2011, with Operation Neptune Spear, a raid by JSOC SMU personnel into Abbottabad, Pakistan. SMU SEALs killed the al Qaeda leader and recovered his body for identification purposes, after which he was buried at sea. It was the end of what may have been the greatest manhunt in history, but not the end of the fight for SOCOM. That continues.

SOCOM at 25 Part 1: The Battle for Capitol Hill

SOCOM at 25 Part 2: Desert Storm to Allied Force

SOCOM at 25 Part 4: The Future

This article was first published in The Year in Special Operations: 2012-2013 Edition.