(4) Historical lessons from past aircraft production restarts; and
(5) Any others matters that the Secretary deems relevant.”
Many have decried Gates’ decision as wrongheaded, including this website and Defense Media Network Senior Writer Robert F. Dorr, in his book Air Power Abandoned. But while Congress has at various times floated the idea of restarting F-22 production, there has never been a sustained effort, and one wonders whether, with Forbes and Wynne this month contributing an op-ed to WSJ as a follow-up to the proposed legislation, this effort might last longer.
Three F-22 Raptor fighter aircraft fly over Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, Aug. 28, 2015 as part of the inaugural F-22 training deployment to Europe. Four F-22s from the 95th Fighter Squadron at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla., along with a C-17 Globemaster III cargo aircraft and more than 50 support Airmen were part of the deployment. This effort is part of the European Reassurance Initiative and will serve to assure allies of the Air Force’s commitment to European security and stability. U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Chad Warren
“Today the U.S. Air Force’s fleet is the smallest and the oldest it has ever been,” the op-ed reads. “Meanwhile, Russia and China have been fielding and exporting new fighters and sophisticated air defenses to countries like Iran. Russia rolled out its first fifth-generation stealth fighter, the PAK-FA, in 2010. China followed in 2011, flight-testing the J-20, an F-22 look-alike [sic], while Secretary Gates was visiting Beijing. Gen. Mark Welsh, the Air Force’s chief of staff, warned last year that future Russian and Chinese jets “will be better than anything we have today.”
“Critics correctly point out that bringing back the F-22 would be expensive. But no one knows exactly how expensive: The only public figures come from the nonprofit Rand Corp., which estimated in 2010 that it would cost over $500 million (in 2008 dollars) to restart production. If the Air Force ordered 75 additional jets, Rand estimated they would cost $179 million each.”
While there are good arguments against restarting F-22 production, and it is an unlikely scenario, it would be interesting to see some real metrics associated with the debate. Because nonexistent studies and assessments were cited in the run-up to F-22 cancellation, it might be illuminating to see at least one analysis, now, even after the fact, taking a clear-eyed look at the costs and benefits of the Raptor in light of future needs. More than any other aircraft in recent memory, the Raptor suffered through accounting that saddled each aircraft with a share of the development costs in calculating the price of each fighter. As procurement numbers went down, this cost figure naturally climbed. This calculation was often used to cite the cost of each aircraft at up to $412 million, when the “flyaway” cost was actually much lower. But if a restarted production line would buy 75 Raptors at $179 million each, what would each cost if you built 200? Even if only 75 additional 5th generation fighters were built, using the critics’ math, restarting production would seem to be a bargain.