“Something else that goes along with that is payload,” he added. “The current HMMWV is operating thousands of pounds beyond its gross vehicle weight rating. It’s crushed from the moment it comes off the production line, and then the Marines just heap that much more stuff on them. It’s what they need to do to accomplish the mission. But the vehicle doesn’t support it. We break many different pieces of the vehicle in doing so.”

According to Burks, improving HMMWV protection levels is “the last thing among the priorities.”

“Force protection is not an outright priority at this point, since JLTV is going to be armored to take those shots,” he said. “But other considerations that are associated with protective features are still very relevant. Consider what we would do to protect gas tanks, as an example, or to improve the vulnerabilities of some sub-assemblies to compromise in the event of taking a hit. Think of things that make the vehicle sufficiently survivable for egress following an impact. Those are all part of that focus on the remaining HMMWVs.”

While the ECV requirements help to identify target capabilities for a large slice of the HMMWV fleet, the fact is that the approximately 13,000 HMMWVs that will remain with the Marine Corps will include approximately 5,000 A2 models.
Burks noted that efforts are already under way at the Nevada Automotive Test Center (NATC) to explore some of the technical possibilities surrounding HMMWV fleet sustainment. “NATC has been assisting us with some concept development and evaluation based on what we have established as basically four distinct concepts that are bound by certain capabilities and cost constraints,” he said. “Essentially it’s cost and performance trades associated with each concept. The user community is fully engaged with us throughout this. Then ultimately, as we reach the end of this process, that user community – the requirements folks – will ‘pull the trigger’ on one of these concepts. And then that’s what we will compete, full and open, to industry.”

Burks emphasized that the NATC testing “does not inform any type of competition. Instead, it informs the requirement. It informs the user community and really establishes for them: At what level is the juice worth the squeeze in terms of the level of capability that this restores to the HMMWV?”

Turning to the ITV, Burks explained that it was initially fielded as a system of systems.

“You had two basic variants: the Light Strike Vehicle to support reconnaissance and infantry; and the prime mover, which was developed to tow the Expeditionary Fire Support System – the rifled towed mortar system,” he said. “The ITV production line ended in FY 12, and last quarter we competitively awarded a Contractor Logistics Support [CLS] award, which is part of a transition from CLS to organic support. It could last up to a few years, but in the interim provides technical and parts support until the completion of ongoing provisioning efforts and current fielding that will not end until late FY 13.”

In addition to the recent CLS contract, Burks highlighted the positive resolution of a recent issue surrounding the ITV.

“In March 2012, we issued something that the Marine Corps only does a few times a decade – specifically a Deadline Statement of Use Message for the entire ITV fleet,” he said. “And that was associated with a throttle binding issue. Nobody was hurt. No equipment was damaged, beyond some cosmetic damage to the grille of one ITV when it contacted the baseplate of the mortar that was being towed in front of it. It was during a new equipment training evolution and they found out that it just wouldn’t stop. So it met that rifled towed mortar at about 5 miles an hour and picked up a little grille damage, but not a scratch on the mortar. Thank goodness nobody was hurt, because what we came to find out upon further inquiry was that this was not a unique circumstance and there were some variances associated with the throttle position sensor that otherwise could result in this happening in other vehicles. In fact, when we dug into some of our FSR [field service representatives] reports in our archives, we found out that there were some anomalies that popped up in as many as 15 fielded vehicles that, for lack of a better term, were precursors to this issue developing. We were so fortunate that from the time we had a hint that this could happen, we had the opportunity to pull the string. It was worth deadlining the entire fleet over. We dug down immediately with the vendor, pulling the whole team in and developing some inspection and corrective action procedures. I would offer that the vendor was very cooperative on this as well and we were able, inside of two weeks, to release a follow-on message that authorized implementation and ‘by vehicle’ restoration of operational status.”

As a representative example of the many other activities under way in his program office, Burks pointed to development of a Marine Corps Transparent Armor Gun Shield (MCTAGS) design with “reducible height” capability. This development effort has included automotive, ballistic, and human factors testing, all of which have yielded promising results.

“This effort is specifically focused on Marine Expeditionary Units and on those assets that get stored on Maritime Prepositioning Ships,” he explained. “But there’s actually quite a bit of interest outside of the Marine Corps in this – SOCOM [Special Operations Command], the Army. Wherever you put these vehicles for deployment you greatly reduce the cube space they take up. If you’ve got a MCTAGS or a GPK [Gunner Protection Kit] that collapses on top of a vehicle without hours spent taking that thing off and finding somewhere else to put it, that’s huge. Embarkation and deployment take on a whole other sense when you’re able to do that.”

This article first appeared in the Marine Corps Outlook 2013-2014 Edition.