Virtually all the teams of TF-52 and -53 were mounted during their operations and armed to the teeth. While some of the teams conducted traditional “discretionary” missions where stealth was the desired result, most were armed with a range of heavy weapons to stand and fight while calling in CAS and artillery to destroy the offending Iraqi units. This was “SOF with an attitude,” taking to heart all the lessons OEF-A had taught in 2001 and 2002.

Though not well-reported, the maritime SOF campaign in the Iraqi littorals was a large and difficult undertaking, involving a wide variety of units from several nations. Beginning on the second night of the war (March 20-21), U.S. Navy SEa-Air-Land (SEAL) and Special Boat Teams, supported by AFSOD-S, Royal Marine commandos, and Polish SOF troops from their GROM (Polish for “thunder”) unit, went into action. The SEALs and GROM commandos took down a number of oil platforms in the northern Persian Gulf, while the Royal Marines took the Al Faw Peninsula.

As planned, the SOF campaign to support the conventional force drive up from Kuwait was to have been a discreet, behind-the-lines affair, with infiltrations beginning several days prior to crossing into Iraq. However, the attempted decapitation strike on Saddam Hussein early on the morning of March 20 changed the entire face of SOF operations in southern Iraq. Deciding to cut short the SOF infiltration and cancel entirely the planned air campaign, CENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks ordered a “rolling start” by his ground forces into southern Iraq, with SOF forces infiltrating by best means to their planned mission areas. Fortunately, TF-52 was able to quickly adapt, with brilliant results.

TF-52’s deep reconnaissance missions were able to get into position and begin calling in CAS to tear up Iraqi Army and Republican Guard units days before the conventional forces were able to bring them to battle. Critical transportation and oil production infrastructure fell rapidly to SF teams, some so efficiently that the units of V Corps and I MEF never knew that SOF units had been there. There even was a highly successful unconventional warfare (UW) operation to take population centers with insurgent forces. Most important, however, were direct support operations to the conventional forces to identify enemy positions for bombing strikes, as well as beginning the difficult job of winning the “hearts and minds” of the beleaguered Shiite Iraqis of the region. They also supported the well-publicized rescue of Pfc. Jessica Lynch, along with the recovery of remains from other victims of the ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company.

TF-53 had its own job to do, somewhat earlier than had been planned. The rapid movement north toward Baghdad meant that TF-53 had to be ready to go into the Iraqi capital when the time came. To get their units near the objective, TF-53 seized an airfield and delivered a number of SF teams to an area less than 50 miles south of Baghdad. The rest of TF-53 was airlifted or moved via road to be ready when V Corps broke into Baghdad in early April. Then TF-53 swarmed into the city, providing critical intelligence to V Corps and I MEF that helped them rapidly take the entire metroplex. They also captured high-ranking Iraqi leadership personalities, located critical targets and facilities, and began to work with the civilian population to bring the city back to life.

 

Securing the Littorals

Though not well-reported, the maritime SOF campaign in the Iraqi littorals was a large and difficult undertaking, involving a wide variety of units from several nations. Beginning on the second night of the war (March 20-21), U.S. Navy SEa-Air-Land (SEAL) and Special Boat Teams, supported by AFSOD-S, Royal Marine commandos, and Polish SOF troops from their GROM (Polish for “thunder”) unit, went into action. The SEALs and GROM commandos took down a number of oil platforms in the northern Persian Gulf, while the Royal Marines took the Al Faw Peninsula. The maritime SOF forces then began to work with mine hunting/sweeping forces to clear the waterway to Umm Qasr, getting the docks open for cargo in just a matter of days. A brilliant campaign, OIF SOF operations in the littorals will be a model for future operations for years to come.

 

The Northern Campaign

The Northern SOF campaign of OIF has its origins in the failed parliamentary vote by Turkey to allow the United States and its coalition allies to use its territory for operations against Iraq. This was the last in a series of failed diplomatic efforts to gain additional basing in countries adjacent to Iraq prior to initiating OIF. The consequences of this vote were potentially devastating to the OIF war plan, as it meant that the 1st Armored Cavalry Division and 4th MID (the heavy elements of III Corps) would not be able to attack Iraq from the north. Their heavy equipment had to be moved by ship to Kuwait, where they eventually joined the units of V Corps and I MEF. Meanwhile, something would have to be done to protect the Kurdish/Peshmerga populations and oil production facilities north of the Green Line from the 11 Iraqi divisions north of Tikrit. That something fell onto the shoulders of then-Col. Charles T. Cleveland.