Norway is also making a significant contribution to our enhanced exercise program, and it has increased its defense spending for 2015. This is very welcome. But there is still a long way to go until Norway reaches the 2% target. With a strong economy, I hope that Norway will set an example for other Allies and commit to reaching that goal.

But in addition to ensuring our collective defense, we must also look beyond our borders. Another priority at the Wales summit was to increase our support to our eastern neighbors, especially Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, who are the main targets of Russian pressure and interference.

Let me add that we don’t see our relations with these countries exclusively through the prism of our relations with Moscow. They are independent countries with internationally recognized borders, who are entitled to pursue their own path. In recent elections, all three countries have chosen leaders and parties that advocate Euro-Atlantic integration – not Russia’s Eurasian Union.

NATO is doing its part. To help Ukraine to modernize and reform its armed forces, we have launched five Trust Funds to assist in areas like command and control, logistics, cyber defense and military medicine. We are sending more advisors to Kyiv and will be carrying out exercises with Ukraine’s armed forces. And we are helping Moldova and Georgia to strengthen their defense capacity in similar ways and, in Georgia’s case, to help it prepare for future membership in the Alliance.

The more stable they are, the more secure we are. So helping Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova – to strengthen their military forces, reform their institutions and modernize their economies – is not an act of generosity; it is in our fundamental strategic interest.

NATO is doing its part. To help Ukraine to modernize and reform its armed forces, we have launched five Trust Funds to assist in areas like command and control, logistics, cyber defense and military medicine. We are sending more advisors to Kyiv and will be carrying out exercises with Ukraine’s armed forces. And we are helping Moldova and Georgia to strengthen their defense capacity in similar ways and, in Georgia’s case, to help it prepare for future membership in the Alliance.

But this defense assistance, like economic support, is only one side of the coin. These countries have to keep their commitments to fight corruption, take hard economic decisions, reach out to their minorities, and build efficient, transparent institutions. Only with these reforms can our help be effective.

Let me conclude by addressing the most difficult question: What should be our approach towards Russia?

First and foremost, before we can re-engage with Russia, Moscow must de-escalate the situation in Ukraine. It must stop sending weapons and supplies to the rebels in the Donbass, it must pull its own soldiers and advisors out of Eastern Ukraine, and it must work constructively to implement the provisions of the Minsk accords – in full, not selectively. The Russian-backed offensive by the separatists over the weekend makes a diplomatic solution more difficult, but it is still the best way out.

Looking beyond the immediate crisis in Eastern Ukraine, we must continue to make it clear to Russia that it cannot have the benefits of integration without respecting the rules. It cannot select the rules it wants to obey and ignore the others. And it cannot impose on the rest of us a new European security order based either on its own rules, or no rules at all.

In the longer run, our strategy has to be one of patience and consistency. Russia expects us to give up the sanctions and go back to business as usual, without changing its own conduct. That is basically what we did after the war in Georgia in 2008. But this time around, having chosen our course, we must stick to it. We must stay united, stay firm and increase the costs to Russia of its aggression. Over time, Russia will see that it is in its own best interests to return to a policy of cooperation – but only if we show it that we take our principles seriously.

We have all woken up to a new security reality here in Europe. We have shown that we are ready to counter and contain a revisionist Russia. And we can continue doing that for a long time if we have to – not because we like it, but because we will not compromise on the rules and principles on which our Alliance and the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area rest.

We do not seek confrontation with Russia. And neither are we looking for regime change. What we do want is for Moscow to change its behavior; to abide by the very good rules that Russia itself once subscribed to; and to return to the spirit of cooperation that has brought all our nations more freedom, prosperity and opportunities than ever before. This may be a long time coming, and will call for strategic patience, but I don’t think we have any alternative.