In recent annual reports to Congress on Chinese Military and Security Developments (CMSD), the U.S. Department of Defense predicted, “By the latter half of the current decade, China will likely be able to project and sustain a modest-sized force, perhaps several battalions of ground forces or a naval flotilla of up to a dozen ships, in low-intensity operations far from China. This evolution will lay the foundation for a force able to accomplish a broader set of regional and global objectives. However, it is unlikely that China will be able to project and sustain large forces in high-intensity combat operations far from China prior to 2020.

“Despite significant improvements, the PLA continues to face deficiencies in inter-service cooperation and actual experience in joint exercises and combat operations. … China continues relying on foreign suppliers for some [naval] propulsion units and, to a much lesser degree, fire control systems, cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, torpedo systems, sensors and other advanced electronics. … The PLA remains untested in modern combat. This lack of operational experience continues to complicate outside assessment of the progress of China’s military transformation.”

Reports from within China (always difficult to verify) indicate the primary Chinese strategy to combat U.S. naval power, including ship- and air-launched missiles and aircraft, would be to destroy or disable the U.S. fleet – or at least the most significant components – in a Pearl Harbor-style first attack, before they could be brought into play. That possibility is increasing the pace and scope of both U.S. Navy and PLA antiship and ship self-defense missile development.

“China produces several families of antiship missiles: Those derived from the Soviet P-15 (SS-N-2 Styx), such as the SY-1/HY-1/HY-2 Safflower/Silkworm (CCS-C-2/CSS-N-2) types; the supersonic C101/C301 (CSS-C-5 Saples/CSS-C-6 Sawhorse) family; the compact C801/C802 (CSS-N-4 Sardine/CSS-N-8 Saccade) in the Exocet class and the new C-602 in the Tomahawk class,” Zaloga wrote in a Teal Group report on Chinese antiship missiles.

“China has been attempting to expand its export sales of antiship missiles, but has had limited success due to its reliance until recently on the outdated Silkworm. The new missiles are an attempt to circumvent the technology gap, but China now faces stiff competition from other advanced antiship missiles, especially those available from Russia.”

Since the 1980s, China has attempted to use export sales of relatively unsophisticated Russian knock-offs to fund development of more advanced missiles – some for export, the most advanced for the PLA. Competition from Russia’s more advanced missiles has seen an estimated 1980s annual production rate of 225 antiship missiles plummet to exports averaging 65 a year since the mid-’90s – and more recently only about 25 per annum, according to reports from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

 

Russia

Since the collapse of the USSR, most of the old Soviet-design bureaus and factories have been consolidated into new consortia. As with much of modern Russia’s military production, the primary focus in naval missiles has been on export, many left over or updated versions of formerly classified Soviet systems. While still generations removed from the U.S. state of the art, Russian naval missiles continue to rank above those from China, which also is one of its two largest customers, along with India.

Moscow’s other, limited capability, small force customers are a niche market requiring far less advanced technologies than those produced for use by or export from the United States, Europe, or Israel.

At the same time, any likely conflict facing the U.S. Navy for at least the next two decades almost certainly would involve adversaries armed with Russian – and, to a lesser but perhaps growing extent, Chinese – naval missiles and defense systems. And in some cases, what they are offering is not so much SOTA technology as what might be seen as the naval version of IEDs.

For example, the Agat Research Institute, a leading missile radar company and co-producer of Russia’s “Club” family of missiles, introduced a new camouflaged cruise missile – the Club-K – at the 2011 IDEX show in the UAE. According to Mosinforsistema Agat, a naval systems integration design bureau, four Club-K launch tubes (the “K” stands for containerized) are hidden within a standard 40-foot ISO shipping container. The tubes are designed to handle 3-54E, 3-54E1, and 3-14E antiship/anti-submarine cruise missiles, which can carry a variety of warheads to ranges up to about 180 nautical miles (nm).

“The Club-K is being promoted as a sea-launch system for use aboard disguised merchant ships, for land launch from standard tractor [trailer] combinations or for use from rail-cars,” Zaloga explained. “Club-K is of significant proliferation concern. It could be used by regional states to attack distant countries, such as the U.S., at intercontinental range by using transoceanic commercial shipping as a means to stealthily approach and stage a missile attack without warning.”

The Indian BrahMos is a modified variant of the Yakhont supersonic antiship missile, produced under license from Russia as a joint venture of NPO Mashinostroyenia and India’s Defense Research Development Organization (DRDO). However, the Indian navy reportedly has had difficulties with the  sub-launched version of the missile. An army version is believed to have fared better, including a “second phase” BrahMos, which had two successful test launches in 2009, leading the Indian army to announce plans to procure 36 of the Block 2 missiles. Later that year, the Indian air force also announced it would acquire an air-to-surface version.

Russia also continues to export ship-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but such naval defense systems tend to be tied to the sale of the warships carrying them, due to size and operational requirements difficult – if not impossible – to retrofit onto other vessels. As a result, the primary customers have been China and India, but growing antagonism between the two Asian giants has further limited sales to both.

As with China, details on Russian naval missile technologies and developments, even when ultimately intended for export, remain shrouded in secrecy. What is known is Russia is working hard to expand its market beyond its traditional customer base. Even so, production of its existing lines has been very low, especially in the last few years. And with sales of existing systems providing primary funding for new R&D, significant advances, at least in this decade, are unlikely.

 

Europe

With major cutbacks in new vessels and overall funding for the British and French navies, Europe’s need for and ability to develop new naval missiles that advance the state of the art also is becoming more and more limited. As with Russia, that also has meant the primary driver for most European Union (EU) defense contractors is export.