While a major part of the AOB’s mission is to create and train local security forces, including tying them into the regional and national security structure, the most difficult jobs are using a fusion of intel from a variety of sources – along with the knowledge of individual SOF warfighters familiar with the area – to identify friends and foes (designated white and red cells, respectively) in the villages, determine who will work with them, provide fair and firm local governance, and bring traditionally hostile local groups together to work peacefully toward a common goal.

“It really starts with trust and building credibility, which, quite frankly, takes time. We often are not greeted with open arms in the villages. Just like any population, it requires effective communications and building trust and credibility. But once that is established, it’s like a light switch turning on. The village elders will work with and support the common objectives – and the village objectives – once you find that common ground,” Christian said.

“You literally have to ask the villagers what they believe to be the biggest problem – with security usually the No. 1 concern. So we spend a lot of time addressing that. But often village security improved dramatically, so you had then to turn to other issues – sometimes agriculture, sometimes employment – but basically long-lasting solutions and methods the locals think are sustainable.”

Such non-kinetic efforts are closer to combat diplomacy than combat itself – with combat diplomacy a skill and task few, including Afghan villagers and local leaders, immediately associate with U.S. Marines, much less Marine special operators. But both regular and SOF Marines today are receiving extensive training in languages, cultures, religions, and regional concerns, worldwide. Combined with MAGTF and MARSOC TTPs and CONOPs, that has created a far more multi-dimensional Marine, capable of both driving an enemy such as the Taliban out of a village or region and negotiating a peaceful, unified approach to future local, regional, and national governance.

In some ways, that also can be seen in the expansion of SOCOM-led JCETs outside of Afghanistan. TSOCs, working with geographic combatant commands (GCCs), determine the operational requirements of a given theater and which nations would most benefit from – and host – JCET exercises.

“JCET benefits SOCOM by working with international partners and bringing additional regional and theater environment experiences to our own operational capabilities. So in Indonesia, we can do amphibious training in a new and different environment – and doing it with a partner force makes it more realistic for us,” Lt. Col. Darren Duke, commander of the 3rd MSOB, said.

“From a MARSOC perspective, we have tried to become more regionally focused. We are a small component within SOCOM and can’t cover the globe the way USASOC can, so we try to bring more focus. In recent years, 3rd Battalion has operated in at least four locations – Indonesia; the Philippines; South America, especially Brazil; and Africa, including Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Kenya. Further back, we were in the ’stans [Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan] for JCETs. So we’ve been in a lot of locations, while 1st and 2nd MSOBs have focused on Afghanistan.”

To date, JCETs have been conducted individually by every SOCOM service component, with MARSOC and USASOC primarily. However, Duke said he would not be surprised to see multi-SOF programs in the future, especially those involving nations with multiple requirements – naval, coastal, urban, desert, mountain. Those differences in environment, along with cultures, governments, and military experience, require a different structure and goal for each JCET.

“In the Pacific, we’re dealing with large bodies of water and archipelago nations very skilled in boat movements and jungle patrols, where in Africa it is primarily operations in desert environments quite different from Iraq and Afghanistan,” he said. “In other places, we are working with more developed countries, such as Brazil, which has a very professional force. So when we work with them, the balance of the exchange is probably more even.”

By law, a JCET must provide training for the U.S. military units and personnel involved, whether working with a modern, experienced host nation military or helping an evolving nation establish a capable internal and regional security capability. That is one reason JCETs do not include elements from other allied nations, such as NATO.

As with the AOBs, JCETs trace their origin to Vietnam. Duke said Green Beret efforts there were the foundation and genesis of SOCOM today, with the JCET also an outgrowth of the winning hearts and minds concept employed there more than 40 years ago.

“It is important to establish a healthy rapport with partners who have their own security needs and work with them where we can to help them meet those where we share the same concerns,” he added. “It is more beneficial to have those countries do the work themselves than have Americans come in and do it. So what we were trying to achieve in a narrow area in Vietnam has become a broad-based component of SOCOM today.

“In addition, the key part of our [internal MARSOC] training is to develop regional expertise, language, and cultural skills. JCET also will be an important vehicle for us to exercise our mobility capability. We’ve been fighting in the desert for a long time, so it will be a great opportunity to get back to the water and our maritime roots. And I think there will be greater interaction with the Marine Corps itself.”