As commander of MSOC Alpha, 1st MSOB, in Afghanistan in 2011, Maj. Andy Christian was part of a rotating persistent-presence command overseeing other SOCOM elements working to bring local tribes together for a common cause. Operating under SOTF-W, Alpha Company was one of two companies – the other led by an Army unit – providing C2 for AOB-811, which included his MSOC, a SEAL platoon, an Army  ODA (aka A-Team), and paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne.

“When we deploy an MSOC, we have about 105 personnel. But what SOCOM has realized is the MSOC can be the headquarters for a much larger SOF force,” Christian said. “When you add all those attached forces, you have more than 500 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines operating under one Marine MSOC commander, which is a substantial capability. Four or five years ago, I never would have imagined commanding a group like that in Afghanistan.

“We were executing a wide variety of SOF missions, with force teams conducting village-to-village stability operations – sending a small team into a village and trying to connect security, governance, and development with the local populace. In order to win a counterinsurgency fight, you need the support of the local population. We got a lot of bottom-up planning, because no one knows these villages better than the SOFs working in and around them.”

The AOB concept is a radical departure from the typical view of what Marines and special operators do in a combat theater. Bringing local Afghan leaders together at the village level, then villages with district and national governance that has never before existed, placed new and complex pressures on the SOF elements – and especially on Alpha Company and its commander.

The AOB would introduce the Afghan Local Police program into a village – selecting, recruiting, and training village locals – then synchronize that with local leaders and regional and district police. The newly organized local police quickly take over village security, with a little SOF assistance.

“That model is sustainable as long as the local population supports the Afghan police force, which is regionally organized and nationally recognized,” Christian explained. “The local police cannot be disconnected from higher levels of security, so we need to connect the local security force to district officials. Over time, SOF will transition the Afghan local police to the district leadership, specifically the district chief of police.

“In addition to the individual operators at the local level, we also have commando forces – Afghan led – who conduct operations against ‘red cell’ groups who are trying to negatively influence villages and the local population. We had multiple cases where a red cell was the chief power locally. If the local population and village leadership wanted to remove the Taliban, but did not have the power to do so, we looked at shaping, under SOF mentorship, how to push the Taliban out and conduct holding and building, then transition to local Afghan officials.”

When AOB-811 deployed, the upper Helmand River Valley was heavily influenced by the Taliban, which controlled several villages. After completing initial mission analyses and determining which villages were ready to accept change, they engaged the district governor and worked with SOTF-W to push the Taliban out. That included installing village stability platforms – essentially, inserting a SOF team into the village to live and work with the local population, often combined with Afghan forces, to separate the “reconcilables” from “irreconcilables.”

“What we saw was a rapid expansion and acceptance of the Afghan message and a dramatic improvement in security. We instituted four new village stability platforms in heavily influenced Taliban areas that today are in firm control by Afghan security forces. More importantly, conditions have been set for governance to be expanded, with local commerce thriving in those villages as they no longer had to worry about IEDs along local commerce routes between villages,” Christian said.

“The No. 1 question the Afghans asked us was: Would things be better if they allowed us to come in? I think we have proved many times the quality of life is much higher when Afghan security forces, partnered with SOF, are able to make a quick – but hopefully long-lasting – impact in that village. Village stability is rapidly becoming the major effort in Afghanistan, so our operations complemented all the other operations under way, which often, in turn, complemented what we were doing.”

Achieving the ultimate goal of linking secured villages all the way up the still-evolving Afghan government structure is a major challenge in a “nation” that has never had a true national or even provincial government. It begins with identifying and understanding the real powers in each village and area, which is further complicated by the lack of a common language. Afghan special forces, for example, speak Dari, the dominant language in the capital city of Kabul, but the major language spoken in Helmand province is Pashto.