Through this, the magazine claims a large measure of credit for the Boston attack. Another article, “The Inevitable,” takes this a step further. The author writes:

“The Blessed Boston Bombings (BBB) have been an absolute success on all levels and domains…When we talk about the Boston operation, we need to shed light on one element; the factor of success. Because it is important to all Muslims generally and the mujahideen in particular to know how brilliant the Tsarnaev [sic] were in planning and accomplishing these jihadi attacks.”

As the author frames the Boston attacks as an “absolute success” and the Tsarnaevs were “inspired by Inspire,” then by extension, Inspire magazine made the Boston bombing succeed. It is a piece of opportunistic propaganda for an al Qaeda vassal whose ranks have been decimated by aggressive Saudi, Yemeni and U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Inspire may have offered bomb-making instructions, and the amateurish English-language publication may have provided some legitimizing messages for the Tsarnaevs, but caution should be exercised over making too much of the magazine’s role in the Boston attacks. Not only does it reinforce al Qaeda’s messaging, it could also diminish the counterterrorism focus on real-world factors driving radicalization.

 

Radicalization is a Real-World Issue

A report from the Bipartisan Policy Center, “Countering Online Radicalization in America,” suggests one of the best ways to combat individuals promoting and engaging in extremist online messaging is “to exploit, subject to lawful guidelines and appropriate review and safeguards, their online communications to gain intelligence and gather evidence in the most comprehensive and systematic fashion possible.”

Certainly, online forums present a community where people can whip up one another’s enthusiasm, perhaps accelerating their readiness to evolve from radical thinker to a radical actor. Monitoring these forums can provide a way for counterterrorism authorities to keep tabs on individuals who might otherwise go unseen (because they are not meeting in a physical location).

However, talk is cheap, particularly online. Is it feasible to distinguish between the thousands of people reading and talking online from the few who take action and become terrorists? How can we separate the viable threats from the noise of online chatter? What are the criteria for deciding who constitutes a real threat versus someone who is all talk?

Could the Tsarnaev brothers have been identified and stopped if their reading habits were somehow monitored? That seems unlikely. The Bipartisan Policy Center is careful to note that First Amendment rights also make it impossible to restrict or remove much of the extremist online material. Regardless, even if a document like Inspire was somehow removed from the Internet, the Tsarnaevs could have found another source for bomb-making details and violent ideology.

While a planned attack may be prepared in the shadows or anonymously online, there are likely outward signs that an individual is treading through the radicalization pathway – signs that people close to the individual might recognize. As well as looking for online threats, it is a worthwhile investment to educate the public about what to do if they notice troubling signs and what those signs might be.

Even as counterterrorism authorities look online for ways to disrupt extremist messaging and information, it should not diminish the important focus on real-world activity.

In a forthcoming book, Homegrown Violent Extremism, author Erroll Southers describes the radicalization pathway and how individuals engage extremist ideology on their road to violence. He writes:

“The radicalization pathway is not a fixed trajectory with specific, identifiable indicators that can be acknowledged on an itemized checklist of ‘suspicious activities.’ No single theory can comprehensively explain radicalization. Consequently, counterterrorism officials and policymakers must understand the overarching concept of radicalization and adopt interdisciplinary approaches when working to reduce opportunities for people to evolve from extremist adherent to violent actor.”

For Southers, the best opportunities for disrupting radicalization are within the community of people around a would-be terrorist. Every extremist has a family, friends and acquaintances, all of whom may be aware of troubling changes in behavior or discussion of violence. Southers also consistently makes the point that violence and terrorism can grow out of a range of extremist ideologies, not only those linked to Islam.

Ruslan Tsarni, uncle to the Tsarnaev brothers, said after the Boston bombing that he had seen changes in Tamerlan’s beliefs and ambitions that indicated radicalization. With the right knowledge, could Tsarni have said or done something to interrupt his nephew’s radicalization process? Were there others who might have dissuaded their actions or reported their suspicions to someone who could? Hindsight is 20-20, but it is insufficient to stop a terror attack. Even as counterterrorism authorities look online for ways to disrupt extremist messaging and information, it should not diminish the important focus on real-world activity.