So regional threats are more in the form of criminal violence, localized violence, and not beyond that. And that’s really a law enforcement concern more than a military concern. Gangs are throughout our country as well as the region. Criminal organizations are throughout our AOR, and as Northern Command will tell you, they are in over a thousand of our cities here in the U.S.

 

There’s also the question of “human terrain” in SOUTHCOM, and how that challenges you, your forces, and your deployed units as they operate in the region. How would you describe the challenges of the present-day human terrain in that region?

It’s a very diverse human terrain, if you will. There’s a lot of poverty within the region, especially as you get to Central America and some of the Caribbean islands. In some of those countries the poverty rate runs between 50 percent and 60 percent.

Their militaries are small, and most of their revenues and budgets go into personnel costs, not to operating costs. So their ability to operate and sustain their capabilities is limited. However, as you look into South America, there’s a real diversity of capability there, and a real diversity of training. As you look at the Andean cultures that are isolated by geography, this isolation puts a really distinct pressure on populations.

For example, if you look at Peru, there’s a lot of people who live on the coastal terrain, while the High Andes are much less populated and are primarily lower-income communities with a much more native culture and heritage. And then you have the Amazon on the other side of Peru. So the human terrain varies from what parts of countries you go to, and how you engage with them.

 

What are your views on how SOUTHCOM is structured from a forces perspective?

Well, I’m comfortable with how we’re resourced, because if you look at our mission and our role and you look at the capacities of the militaries that we engage with, we’re structured to meet those demands. We, on a day-to-day basis, have about 4,000 to 6,000 people assigned to us. Part of those forces are the detainee guard forces associated with Joint Task Force Guantanamo that are managing and running those facilities.

Another good portion of assigned forces are on the ships and aircraft that support our detection and monitoring mission for counter-drug activity in the maritime environments of the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. And the majority of the other routine forces are associated with engagements such as subject-matter expert exchanges, conducting routine training, and military-to-military training exercises. And all those need to be measured on the tempo that our partners can also meet, and so we have a steady demand on the resources of our U.S. armed services that help support us.

From my standpoint, we’re pretty well resourced for the engagements that we have on a routine basis. Now, I’ll use Haiti as an example. If we need forces because we have a crisis, then we request those forces from the Department of Defense, and then those forces fall in to meet the needs that we have.

 

If you had a “wish list,” would you want more resources to do your job, or are you happy with what you’ve got?

Well, there are always ongoing discussions about that. We can always use forces that are familiar with working within Latin America and the Caribbean, forces that understand the capabilities and capacities of the armed forces that we work with day in and day out, and can build relationships – which are an important factor in our mission at SOUTHCOM. And so there are discussions right now with the U.S. Army, U.S. Marines, as well as U.S. Special Operations Command [SOCOM]. Is there a benefit in designating – not necessarily assigning, but designating – units that will, on a routine basis, engage with forces in Latin America? I am in favor of that concept. And I want to be very clear here: They wouldn’t “give” them to me. They would “designate” them so that their focus for engagement and for conducting training is on Latin America, not on a global basis. I think that’s important. Now, I will still have to resource them in the same manner I do today. And I’m OK with that. That’s the reality of the world we live in, and that is the way all regional commanders engage with our partner nations on a military-to-military basis. In conducting exercises, in training with them, and including them in educational programs, what we do here at SOUTHCOM is no different than from what I experienced in PACOM.

Now, SOUTHCOM’s engagements may, in some cases, be a little different from how PACOM will engage, though that’s changing in this region as well. In fact, Colombia is sending aircraft to participate in Operation Red Flag this year, out at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. Brazil has also participated in Red Flag in the past. So, again, the training venues and the training capabilities used by combatant commands are identical no matter which command you go to. The application may be a little different, but the tools are the same.

Now, that said, the other issue that we face here is transnational organized crime, TOC. And that means we have to put all of the pieces together across the whole of government to address the TOC issue. The military and the Department of Defense have a role to play, though ours is a supporting role. In addition, our engagements with USAID [United States Agency for International Development], our engagement with the State Department, [and] our engagement with law enforcement are very deliberate and routine, because that’s the reality of how we have to sequence and work our programs to make sure we’re all working in conjunction with one another. So that’s where I see a difference, but this is also happening in other combatant commands as well.