With the delay in delivery of the F-35 to the Corps, what is planned to keep legacy platforms fully operational in the interim – and does that include any new buys?

We don’t anticipate any new buys as we wait for JSF. We will continue to manage the service life of our F/A-18s via a service life extension program. We’ll also calculate the remaining flight hours on each aircraft and manage our flight time on each so we have adequate margins.

On the JSF, it is more accurate to characterize it as a reduction in ramp-up for a couple of years, which the commandant [Gen. James F. Amos] has said is prudent to deal with the technology challenges you meet on any program. We’ve already purchased 32 JSFs, with four now flying. The first F-35B [has arrived] at Eglin [Air Force Base, Fla.] … and the first -B in the first operational squadron will go to [Marine Corps Air Station] Yuma [Ariz.] in the fall of 2012.

 

What will the F-35B STOVL and F-35C carrier variants bring to the fight compared to the aircraft they will replace, starting with the AV-8B Harrier jump jet (1985-2003)?

Again, in terms of capability, the -B has additional basing flexibility and the -C has more range. It’s an entire new generation of aircraft and the issues that stand out most are stealth, the sensors – which are incredible, especially the ranges at which they can produce high-fidelity pictures – and weapons-quality coordinates, which have no comparison.

The F/A-18C/D Hornet fighter/attack (1987-2000)?

The F-35 is performing to spec and is an extremely stealthy aircraft, so comparisons to some legacy platforms are not correct.

 

The EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare (1977-1991)?

We refer to MAGTF-EW [electronic warfare] as a system of systems. The Prowler has an unmatched capability, especially with the ICAP [Improved Capability] III. But the age of the airframe eventually will require us to sundown that aircraft. So our goal is to take something that is high demand – the Prowler – and make that EW capability more prevalent.

One way to do that is to design systems for multiple platforms, including UAS [unmanned aerial systems]. Obviously, when the F-35 rolls off the flightline, it can operate in environments other aircraft can’t, due to stealth, and can provide some EW capability. So what we intend to do is put some next-generation jammers on the F-35 to provide additional capacity.

 

How does the recent addition of the -C variant – replacing 80 F-35Bs in the original Marine Corps buy – change Corps missions and capabilities through the next few decades?

TACAIR [tactical aircraft] integration is something we’ve done since World War II, so it’s nothing new. Early on, our desire was to operate -Bs on all ships, including the big-deck carriers. One of the challenges, from the Navy perspective, is it is difficult to operate the -B with other conventional airplanes, not just the F-35C, but E-2 [Hawkeye tactical airborne early warning aircraft] and F/A-18s for many years to come.

So the issue is not the ability to recover airplanes, but the launch sequence – how you move aircraft around the deck, which would be sub-optimized with the F-35B in the mix. Thus the commandant felt it was prudent to go with five squadrons of -Cs, which still gives us a much greater STOVL force than we’ve had before.

 

How does the addition of the F-35C affect the Corps’ carrier-based expeditionary air TTPs and CONOPs versus what had been planned with all-F-35B squadrons?

Once the airplanes are up and away, CONOPs are pretty much the same in terms of sensors and employment. Again, the primary difference between the two is basing. So, in my view, it really doesn’t change the employment of the airplane. In fact, -Bs and -Cs could deploy together without missing a step.

 

The commandant and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, deputy commandant for aviation, have emphasized that conversion to the F-35 will double the number of U.S. capital ships projecting fifth-generation fighter capability around the globe – 11 Navy carriers and 11 Marine Corps amphibious assault ships. What does that actually mean to Corps missions and capabilities, as well as overall U.S. maritime combat aviation?

The point is you increase the return on investment. One thing we saw in Libya was the [USS] Kearsarge [LHD 3 amphibious assault ship] when the [USS] Enterprise [CVN 65] was needed elsewhere. The big-deck carriers provide an unmatched capability, but they can’t be everywhere. And sometimes, less can be more, with Libya being an excellent example.

You also may have a contingency operation with high threats where it makes sense to use both big-deck and amphibious ships. And with each passing year, fifth-gen capability will become more and more important [on both].

 

Do you see any other nation challenging U.S. carrier capability through mid-century?

Whether or not potential adversaries have carriers is important, but that is not the main part of the discussion. My point is, what does the nation need for forward presence and what is the number of ships required to do that? That is the capability that needs to be maintained.

 

As an F/A-18 pilot, what is your reaction to F-35 test pilots saying the JSF has flight characteristics more similar to the Hornet than may have been expected?

I would take issue with it being more so than may have been expected. The aircraft is performing exactly as expected. The F-18 is a very maneuverable aircraft; now you have a stealth airplane with the advantage of coming in undetected, plus the additional missiles we have. And in terms of maneuverability, the JSF will be just fine.

But when talking stealth, whether F-22 or F-35, in the air-to-air arena, that gives you the advantage. You don’t want to show up at a fight evenly matched or with a disadvantage.

 

The Corps also is replacing its KC-130F/R transport aircraft with the KC-130J Super Hercules: What requirements are driving that and what does the new platform offer over the legacy aircraft it is replacing?

This is a little bit different. The KC-130s are very busy platforms, able to go long distances and carry a lot of payload. The -130J is a better KC-130, with more efficient engines, for example. But, essentially, we’re doing what we’ve always done with the KC-130s, just with a newer platform.

 

Turning to unmanned aerial vehicles/systems (UAV/UAS), which types and sizes of unmanned aircraft does the Corps currently operate – and for what missions?

We have the Raven, a small platform flown by battalions. The Shadow is flown by our VMU [UAS] squadrons and is the mainstay of our UAS force. In the past 10 years, we have used a lot of contract UAVs, especially the ScanEagle, but we will divest ourselves of that down the line.

The Small Tactical UAS [STUAS], made by Insitu – which also makes the ScanEagle – will be owned and operated by the Corps. That is important because it will, for the first time, give us an organic UAS capability for our MEUs [Marine Expeditionary Units], which we have not had on a recurring basis other than via contract UAS.

The Shadow performs ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and has a laser designator used to guide weapons, but we intend to weaponize our larger UAVs. It may surprise you to know, before you can weaponize a UAV, you have to be in compliance with treaty restrictions, which we are working through various agencies.

 

What plan does the Corps have for future UAS acquisitions – and what is driving the requirements for those?

In the near term, our priority is to field the STUAS, with IOC around 2013. The next priority is weaponization. Third, we are looking at a Group 4 UAS, but have not yet settled on specific requirements. The Army flies the Gray Eagle, which is essentially a Predator-class, and we’re looking at what the Navy is doing, but we haven’t yet settled on what a Marine Group 4 would be.

Our nominal time frame for the Group 4 would be around 2018 to bring that larger, longer endurance capability to the Corps, with IOC around 2020.

 

Does the Corps see UAS as an aviation or a ground-element component?

It’s an aviation asset. True, the Raven is operated by the battalions, but when talking about larger platforms, such as the Shadow or eventually a Group 4, it will be an aviation asset. But that’s not a particularly important distinction. We operate it because we procure those types of capabilities and have the squadrons in place to fly them.

 

How important are UAVs to the Corps, both for ISR and hunter/killer missions?

I think they are very important, especially the persistence capability. We have to balance that with the threats we might face across the range of military operations. In a higher threat environment, with a surface-to-air threat, the requirements change.

 

Do you see any Corps requirement in the next 20 years for a large-scale unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), such as the Navy’s current UCAS-D (demonstrator) or proposed future Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) platform?

We need persistence and ISR and fires and it all needs to be expeditionary. So I can see a requirement for the types of capability those systems would provide, but it may have to be something that can take off and land in a shorter area and operate in an austere environment.

So for UAS capability writ large, I think there will be a requirement for that type of platform, with greater persistence and fires, but I wouldn’t say what either the Navy or Air Force currently are working on would meet our needs.

 

Is the Marine Corps developing a UAS career track?

We have UAS squadrons and specialties for UAS. We’re still working through how we manage career progression for the UAS community and haven’t yet gotten to our end state.

We recently fielded our Harvest Hawk, the weaponized version of the KC-130J, and for the first several deployments, the fire control officer, who makes the decisions for employment, is an F/A-18 weapons officer, someone who has that kind of experience. That’s an example of the kinds of things we are considering as we build the capacity of our UAS squadrons.

Everything we introduce, unmanned or not, we want to be integrated as part of the overall effort.

This interview first appeared in Defense: Review Edition 2011/2012.