The next item I’d like to talk to is our MH/AH-6 Little Bird fleet. U.S. Special Operations Command just approved the Block 3 upgrade, which is what I would call a near-term safety and sustainment bridging strategy to get us through probably 2025 to 2030 with this airplane. We’re going to look at some improvements to the drive train, the airframe structure, rotor system, and the like, all long overdue. But that really is a bridging strategy.

What I’m worried about now is what are we going to do for the future replacement for the Little Bird? We were very, very interested in the Army’s Armed Aerial Scout program, which was just recently canceled by the Army due to the budget cuts they’ve had. So we’re looking at what our options are about how to replace the Little Bird fleet. We are in close consultation with the Army on this matter, trying to figure out a path ahead that benefits both SOCOM and the Army. And it’s a difficult process. But, I will tell you that we are committed to being transparent with the Army and the Army has been very forthcoming and transparent with us in looking at different ways to tackle this problem. And here’s the bottom line: We are going to have to have a replacement for the Little Bird sometime in the 2030 time frame. Now, some people out there are saying, “Well that’s 2030, and that’s 16 years away.” Well, that is 16 years away, but the way our acquisition system works with starting a new airplane program we have to start now. We have to start investing now, defining the requirement and funding some preliminary research and development to see what the specifications are going to be. I will tell you that we are going to build that airplane around three key performance parameters, and those are range, speed, and payload.

What I’m worried about now is what are we going to do for the future replacement for the Little Bird? We were very, very interested in the Army’s Armed Aerial Scout program, which was just recently canceled by the Army due to the budget cuts they’ve had. So we’re looking at what our options are about how to replace the Little Bird fleet.

At the end of the day, all of our missions terminate in a hover and vertical flight, and I’m looking for 200- to 250-knot cruise speed, which is over double what we get out of our current fleet. But we also have to be able to deliver the requisite amount of payload in a hover for the ground force. At the end of the day, if we can’t do that, the airframe we choose is irrelevant. It doesn’t matter how fast we get there, if we can’t deliver the right payload in support of that SOF operator on the ground then I’m not interested in it. So, range, speed, and payload are really the three legs of the stool that we’re going to move forward on.

 

And is the MH-47G force in good shape right now too?

No. The -47G force is my most compelling modernization need. There’s an interesting article in a recent issue of The Tip of the Spear magazine that has a picture of several Vietnam-era Army aviators that flew the same airplane that our guys are flying now … I believe the tail number was 756, and it is over 46 years old. Right now our MH-47 fleet is a legacy airframe structure that is a sheet metal and riveted aircraft. During the last decade, the Army went to a machined frame airplane – what we call a semi-monocoque structure – with their -F model CH-47s. However, due to the requirement to get the 160th SOAR into the fight and to improve our capability in Iraq and Afghanistan, we did not undergo that modernization. So the average airframe age of our aircraft is around 49 years old. And the life cycle of these is a max of 50 years and about 10,000 flight hours. We’re going to exceed that dramatically across the fleet in another two years.

So, we’re looking at what we call the MH-47 RENEW program, where we convert our fleet to that machined frame. Now, that’s going to take a significant investment from the Army and from SOCOM, and we’re still figuring out exactly the way ahead. But I will tell you that I just briefed Adm. McRaven and Lt. Gen. Cleveland, as well as the other service component commanders of SOCOM, on this need recently. All are committed to the Little Bird future replacement airplane, and they are committed to renewing our MH-47 fleet to ensure we remain relevant for the long term.

 

Since the night of Oct. 19, 2001, when the only aircraft that could make it over a certain 19,000-foot pass in Afghanistan were four MH-47s, your units, your aircraft, and your people had been fully engaged and committed to the widest variety of combat operations imaginable. Are we asking too much of Army SOF aviation? And, if we are … what do we need to make more of it?

No. I will say that I don’t think we’re asking too much of us at all. We have a steadfast commitment and a sacred obligation to supporting the special warfare operator on the ground. And the duration of our combat operations over the last 12-plus years has been both unprecedented and exceptional in our history and the history of the nation. You are absolutely correct: That night in October 2001, Army special operations aviation performed a mission that no other nation in the world – no other aviation force in the world – could have accomplished. And, we’ve continued to perform missions, some that have been acknowledged publicly and some that haven’t. You know, I’m frequently asked, “What did all this blood and treasure that the nation gave up to stand up the 160th … what did it really get us?” And what I will tell you is in the case of “Desert One” [Operation Eagle Claw in 1980], our nation failed in the most dramatic of ways because we couldn’t get into position to rescue the 52 American hostages in Tehran. And based on the findings of the Holloway Commission, we as a nation made a decision to resource not only the 160th SOAR, but several other SOF units.

Then we flash forward to Oct. 19 of 2001, and there was a mission that was eerily similar in some ways, from launching off an afloat staging base at similar distances and ranges, but we performed that mission successfully. We were able to strike back at those that attacked the U.S. on 9/11 in a matter of weeks, and I think that was what made that investment worthwhile. Are we asking too much of our SOF aviation force? Absolutely not. We here at ARSOAC are doing what we were created to do. One thing that is very unique about Army special operations aviation is that we exist for one purpose and one purpose only: that is to support the special operator on the ground.

Whether that is a soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine, our commitment is and remains steadfast and unwavering: to support those operators on the ground even when it places our own forces at great peril. We’ve demonstrated that over and over again. People are more important than hardware, and that’s certainly true within the Army special operations aviation community.

And, the last thing I’d say is, as we look towards the future, to answer your earlier question, do we need more of us? No, we need to be smarter about how we’re employing our forces, and also need to continue to be a learning, evolving organization. As the nature of the enemy changes and the requirements for the special operator on the ground change in response, we have to be the organization that embraces that change, and leads that change so we’re maintaining that sacred trust with our ground force brothers. And that we’re also maintaining that comparative advantage over our adversaries.

This interview was first published in The Year in Special Operations: 2014-15 Edition.