There were some things we could do rapidly to bring people together. I had the opportunity to speak at the Fleet Maintenance and Modernization Symposium in Norfolk in September, and address some of the concerns I had with the port engineers who were in attendance as well as commercial maintenance organizations. What grew out of that was what we called the “maintenance summit,” which were held the week of Nov. 18-19, and brought together all of the flag leadership who impact the maintenance of our surface ships. We had Vice Admiral Will Hilarides (Commander Naval Sea Systems Command) in addition to the fleet maintenance officers; the flag officer responsible for maintenance and modernization for our surface ships; the flag officer responsible for commanding the regional maintenance centers; and one of the strike group commanders who represented “the customer.” Both resource sponsors were there from OPNAV N95 and N96. And what I wanted was to have a robust discussion about the barriers between where we are and where we want to be, and what responsibility we have on the government side to knock those barriers down. A number of action items came out of this summit, and the unique opportunity to get all of the admirals together to make sure that the readiness of our ships is moving in the right direction. It was a robust discussion, and I think we’ll be able to move forward in addressing some of the material and modernization concerns we have on our ships. Because as I review the operations over the last decade and a half, we have been running our ships very – and our people very, very – hard. Our ballistic missile defense ships are deploying on short turnarounds. We have turned our carrier strike groups around quickly. We have deployed them for longer. And all of that has had a detrimental effect, I think, in the overall material readiness of our ships. So we need that common understanding of what needs to be done with maintenance to knock down the barriers and get to where we need to be.

The other partner in this is the private yards. The vast majority of our maintenance is executed by our partners, our teammates, who run the private yards. It was important as part of this summit to bring in the leadership of the big private yards, have a discussion with them about what they think the barriers are, and how we can knock those barriers down.

This all leads to the #1 priority I have for the surface force – and that is “warfighting first.” This is aligned with CNO and, in my heart and mind, the thing that drives me. I want to put confidence and competence in the hearts and minds of our commanding officers and their crews, so as they proceed out past the sea buoy going to do the nation’s bidding, they are confident. Confident in their ability; confident in the ability of the men and women who they serve with and who they lead; confident in the condition of the ship that they’re standing on; and competent in the execution of whatever mission might be assigned to them.  As SURFOR I owe them that. I’ve talked with (Rear Adm.) Pete Gumataotao at SURFLANT about this and he feels the exact same way. That’s what we owe the men and women on our ships. It’s our responsibility to provide that. We need to keep warfighting in the forefront of our minds –  “warfighting first” – and do all the things that allow our commanders and Sailors to be confident and competent. That encompasses a myriad of things – whether it’s making sure that they’re getting paid on time; making sure that their families are properly taken care of; and making sure that they have the proper medical support – all those kind of foundational leadership things, because it’s all about the men and women who serve on our ships. If we provide that, our people who are serving don’t have to worry about it. They can go execute the nation’s bidding when they’re deployed, turn around and come back victorious.

 

You touched on maintenance. The commercial shipyards are your partners…

The yards that assist us in maintaining our ships, and the Navy organizations that we have ashore who provide the coordination, are vital to the material readiness of our fleet. We’ve got to work daily to ensure there’s as little daylight as possible between us. They are in business to make a profit, but it’s also very clear to me they’re keenly interested in ensuring they deliver a good product to the United States Navy. It’s incumbent upon us to ensure we assist them to the maximum extent we can to deliver on the latter, and they’ll make sure they’re delivering on the former.

 

USS Fort Worth is now on a 16-month deployment. LCS was intended to deal with the challenging asymmetric threats in the littoral – namely quiet diesel submarines, fast, armed surface craft, and mines. Is LCS going to make us dominant in the littoral?

The short answer is yes. However, I think that you have to take the long view in understanding how we are going to continue to develop the ship, the systems that go in it, as well as the employment concepts. The littoral combat ship was designed and developed to address three requirements: hunting mines, hunting quiet diesel submarines, and anti-surface warfare in the littorals. We have declared IOC (initial operating capability) of the SUW mission package, and we will have delivered on that requirement. We’re continuing to work on delivering the requirements with respect to the ability to hunt mines in the littorals, and the ability to hunt submarines in the littoral and beyond. But I think we have to be cognizant of what’s happening around the world, and around the ocean as we work to bring these ships into the fleet. We’re on glide slope to deliver on those things that were required of the ship at its inception. I think they will do so much more for the combatant commanders, fleet commanders, strike group commanders, and for, perhaps, the joint force beyond that.