Lundquist: There has been some discussion in the media recently about activating the Aegis Ashore test facility at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on Kauai, to give it an actual operational role to defend against North Korean ballistic missiles.

I think the land reclamation effort was behavior not consistent with trying to achieve a negotiated settlement. Certainly it changes how we look at the impact of the features – because some are high tide, and some are low tide – and certainly how we’d look at them at different phases of a crisis. But fundamentally our disagreement is with China not taking a diplomatic negotiations-based approach to resolving the legitimate sovereignty issues in the South China Sea.

Montgomery:  Probably, I think, a better description is that we would like to do a study. There’s no doubt the defense of the homeland is our number one mission, whether in Pacific Command or Northern Command, and Hawaii is part of the homeland. And so we have undertaken to study over the next few months what is the best way to defend the homeland, and specifically the defense of Hawaii – and what role would any facility would play in that will be part of that analysis.

Lundquist:  There has been a lot of attention on the South China Sea and East China Sea, and some of the disputed territories that are there. China, in particular, has built up some of these disputed islands. There’s a dispute as to whether or not they have sovereignty, but they’re assuming that they do and they’re now building infrastructure that they’ll be able to assert their claims. What’s our position on those facilities that they’ve created?

Montgomery: First, I would say we don’t recognize anyone’s sovereignty claim in the Spratly Islands, or more broadly, in almost any of the South China Sea islands in dispute. And we believe that there must be a negotiated agreement to the sovereignty in relationship with each of these features, be they low tide elevations, high tide elevations, or islands. And we don’t believe that the Chinese reclamation efforts, or their subsequent militarization of these facilities, contributes to a negotiated solution, and, as such, we have diplomatically lodged our disagreement, and we’ve diplomatically discussed our disagreements with the Chinese.

Lundquist: But doesn’t the discussion change when it becomes a “base,” with a militarized facility?

Montgomery: I think the land reclamation effort was behavior not consistent with trying to achieve a negotiated settlement. Certainly it changes how we look at the impact of the features – because some are high tide, and some are low tide – and certainly how we’d look at them at different phases of a crisis. But fundamentally our disagreement is with China not taking a diplomatic negotiations-based approach to resolving the legitimate sovereignty issues in the South China Sea.

Lundquist: What’s our position on China’s “Nine-Dash-Line?

Montgomery: We don’t state our position on the Nine Dash Line. But one thing that concerns me about the land reclamation is the environmental effect. I think, realistically, if the US government began conducting land reclamation on this level, outside of San Diego or around Hawaii or in the Caribbean, there would be significant non-governmental organization, environmental organization interest in our efforts. I remain surprised and disappointed at the lack of environmental NGO research, study, analysis, and reporting on the Chinese land reclamation efforts. The limited study I have seen indicates both environmental challenges to the reefs and significant environmental impacts on the associated South China Sea fisheries, which are not insignificant in terms of world-wide production. There’s very little basic research – not even advanced research – but really basic research of what’s going on. I think we have Chinese governmental assurances of minimal impact, but I don’t know the degree to which those are supported by scientific fact.