We are also working access issues, we now have increased access to Singapore both for both the littoral combat ship (LCS) and our P-8 deployments. In Japan, we deployed our first P-8s and they’re a growing percentage of the P-8 and P-3 split as we modernize our MPA fleet. They clearly bring out a whole new level of capability to the fight in terms of speed, range, and prosecution capability. We have a new and improved relationship with the Japanese that has supported their own internal deliberations on the Japanese constitution and the applicability of their collective self-defense laws. It has resulted in closer relations with the Koreans, which has led to things such as a discussion on the introduction of THAAD. And then in the Philippines, probably the biggest one would be the signing of the EDCA – the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. That is going to allow us to work collaboratively to improve Philippine infrastructure, bases and facilities for use by Philippine and U. S. forces. So there’s been the diplomatic improvements, there’s been the military improvements, and I think we have a big economic improvement coming through in the TPP. I think you will see another level of strategic rebalancing coming forward, because the Pacific rebalance is really an acknowledgement that we’re a Pacific nation, we’re a Pacific power, and we’re a maritime power. There’s an increasing percentage of trade and GDP flow in the Pacific. If you add the United States and the Asian countries together, we well exceed 50 percent of world GDP. So there is a lot of opportunity out here for the United States as a trading nation, and therefore there is a need for us to continue to provide the stability, and strategic partnerships that have led to prosperity over the last 70 years and continue that going forward. So the strategic rebalance is really about both today and the future, and therefore I think there will be further steps in our rebalancing of our military going forward over the next decade. We are working closely with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] on that right now. One thing I’d say, as a sidebar, is about forward stationing. We, the Navy, have understood the value of forward stationing for years, from the initial development of coaling stations in the 1910s and ‘20s, or after World War II, when we wanted to keep some forces forward to maintain peace and stability in an unsure environment. Forward stationing has been a key element of Navy thinking. We see it in all four services. For PACOM, particularly, with high-end combatants and aircraft that are needed to be available in the first 72 to 96 hours of crisis, you can’t have a destroyer or a submarine at San Diego and say that that’s a legitimate answer to an immediate crisis in the western Pacific. Therefore, the value of forward stationing is the response time, and a higher deployment ratio. Most of our ships in Japan deploy in theater about six months a year, whereas in an OFRP (optimum fleet readiness plan) cycle for a San Diego ship will give you 7 months of deployment plus some surge capability in a 32 to 36-month cycle. So clearly, 6 out of 12 months in perpetuity exceeds the stateside ORFP deployment model. You can see the advantage in a crisis as well, that destroyer in Japan could be ready in 72 to 96 hours about 9 months of the year. So you have an advantage of both deployment presence and crisis response presence that really can’t be replicated. That challenge isn’t exactly the same for the other services.  You might be able to move 5th generation fighters from the west coast or the east coast of the United States to a crisis in 72 to 96 hours – although you might not have all the infrastructure support you’d want, in fact, I suspect you wouldn’t – but you’d have some capability or capacity. With a ship, or submarine, or an aircraft carrier, it’s either present or it’s not present at the start of the crisis. And forward stationed forces give us that presence. So we have been the largest beneficiary, but also the strongest advocates of continuing that Navy commitment to forward stationing. We have a similar benefit with the four forward deployed DDGs in Rota.

Lundquist: They have a critical BMD mission, along with the Aegis Ashore facility in Romania.

Montgomery:  I will say this about Aegis Ashore, I think the Navy properly understood that maintaining the continuity of the software with our ship-based systems, and therefore that led a need for continuity with U.S. Navy personnel.

Lundquist: Are they thinking about Aegis Ashore in Japan?

Montgomery:  I think the Japanese are thinking about different solutions to their BMD problem with North Korea. And I imagine seeing the success of Aegis Ashore in Europe, and seeing the success of THAAD in Guam, will cause them to look at both those systems. But those are internal Japanese decisions. I wouldn’t be surprised if Aegis Ashore is part of their thought process.