Can you talk a little about the “smart power” concept please?

Well, “smart power” – the words were coined by Joseph Nye, Jr. up at Harvard University – is all about synchronizing action by all elements of a government overseas. It takes “hard power,” which are the forces and capabilities that DoD has and is good at using, and combines it with “soft power,” which includes all the diplomacy pieces like working with foreign nations to improve their infrastructure, medical capabilities, governance, and such – all those kinds of things that would traditionally be done by other government agencies like the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Information Agency if it were still properly funded. You put those two things together, and use them in the appropriate mix, and you get smart power. You want to use the DoD where it is appropriate, and use all the other elements of government where they are appropriate. With that, you get smart power.

I think that SOCOM’s Global War on Terror plan was a microcosm of that. SOF is known for being able to do the indirect [soft power]portion, changing the environment where enemy works and lives, as well as the direct [hard power] portion where the impact on the enemy is more “kinetic” – things like training our partner nations to be better able to defend their borders, and assistance in the information operations realm. My point is that SOCOM wrote the DoD Global War on Terror plan, and it matches up well with the smart-power construct we have been talking about. It is about eliminating all the things in an environment that allow your enemy to work. SOCOM has the tools that can work to assist that effort across the board, like our civil affairs personnel which are critical, and psychological operations forces that are so good at the information piece of the equation.

If you look at what the Navy did during the tsunami relief effort in 2004 and 2005, that is possibly the best example of smart power I can think of in modern history. Think about it. We went in there with all those great Navy helicopters and what are traditionally called “warships” on a humanitarian mission that saved thousands of lives. But just as importantly, the people’s opinion in that area of Asia of the United States, its value systems, and what this nation all about changed dramatically once they saw us come in. Now you cannot wait around for a natural disaster to happen around the world to give you an opportunity to conduct a smart power operation. But there are things that we can do, with the capabilities that we already have, like the regional cruises of the hospital ships Comfort and Mercy. There has to be sustainability to it. We conduct medical capability [MEDCAP] engagements and port calls all over the world, but they traditionally are just a few weeks long, what I used to call “random acts of engagement.” These efforts need to become more sustainable by DoD partnering with other parts of government.

Given your career experience, can you give us any sort of insight into the kinds and mix of ground forces you see emerging into the U.S. military in the next several decades?

First let me say that all our formations, from every service and from every area in every service, are magnificent. Each brings their own form of excellence to the battlefield. Obviously there will be a growth of more SOF units, but additionally I would think you will see the continued growth of the conventional force. Again we have relearned the importance of boots on the ground, and the importance of light- and mountain-capable forces. The type of terrain and the mission in Afghanistan lends itself to presence, and that means boots on the ground. And that means soldiers and Marines.

We can never discount the importance of being ready for every threat, so there will always be a need for our heavy forces that have served so well in our current fight as well. The Third Infantry Division’s “Thunder Run” into Baghdad at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF] will continue to be one of the great events of these wars. Hopefully we will see a growth across the services in those enablers that are critical to any fight. Army aviation is one that is extremely high demand. We also need additional military police, intelligence units, and dog teams, just to name a few. The services have taken this on already and are transforming units every day, but in the end, during a time of persistent conflict and small wars, these forces are critical.

Do you see the present focus on existing contingency operations driving decisions like the recent cancellation of the Army’s Future Combat System, and the current reconsideration of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle?

I see the attempt to balance the force and meeting today’s threat while keeping an eye on what is needed in the future to enable the soldier driving most present-day acquisition decisions. The difficulty is defining what is the correct balance. The current wars have shown us a shortfall in boots on the ground, along with a critical shortfall in people with the right linguistic and cultural capabilities. Security forces provide a key to any counter-insurgency fight, and we were immediately short military police early in OIF. Soon, thanks to some great work by the Army, there were trained field artillery soldiers and others doing the dangerous but critical job of guarding convoys and protecting installations. That is just one of hundreds of examples of flexibility and speed in the way the services reacted to emerging requirements.