So the lessons of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz still apply, as do the need to fulfill core missions like air supremacy, sea control, and superiority at the point of attack?

Absolutely! But I think Gen. Peter Schoomaker, USA [the 35th chief of staff of the Army], was right when he said, “The preponderance of future wars will be more like Sun Tzu than Clausewitz.”

Based upon your own extensive experience in the areas of unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations, and expeditionary warfare, what do you see as the short-term trends in training, organization, and equipping for ground units heading into America’s present contingency operations (Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) overseas?

First I would say that the services, and specifically the Army and the Marines, have made a major course change in the methods they use to train for the Afghanistan and Iraqi battlefields. The emphasis on small-unit tactics and the impressive efforts at the Combat Training Centers [like Fort Irwin, Calif., and Fort Polk, La.) to replicate and problem-play the scenarios that soldiers and Marines will be facing is incredible and undoubtedly has made us more successful. And we cannot forget the Air Force and Navy, that perform their traditional roles but have also taken on some dangerous ground missions and done them very well. After all, the key to warfare is the people that are trained, equipped, and empowered to fight it. … In this type of warfare, it is even more important that every individual understands the importance of when to pull a trigger, not just to pull the trigger.

Do you feel the existing processes of review (QDR, etc.) provide an appropriate level of MACOM and COCOM input into the development of ground forces within DoD?

On the equipment side I have seen the vice chief of staff of the Army [VCSA-Gen. Peter Chiarelli] and the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps [ACMC – Gen. James Amos, USMC] testify for lightweight equipment. This is key. The terrain in Afghanistan, specifically on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, is the toughest on earth. We need to give our soldiers their best chance for success, and that means that they must be incredibly physically fit, and their equipment must be right. Everything from their armaments to their body armor to the types and amounts of ammunition they carry has to be evaluated. You absolutely cannot send soldiers into combat when they are burdened to the point they cannot move. It is obvious to me that the VCSA and the ACMC get it. I am sure the same message is coming from the combatant commanders and the troops, so I am certain the QDR team at DoD will pay attention. It is important.

We’ve obviously seen an incredible array of achievements by the U.S. SOF community since the September 11 attacks. How do you see these kinds of forces and operations contributing to long-range resolutions of existing contingency operations around the world, and are there enough SOF units to meet the needs of regional COCOMs?

On the SOF question, as I have visited battlefields across the world, I was completely impressed by the SOF tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as the equipment that started in SOF but quickly migrated to the conventional forces when the young officers and NCOs saw the task at hand. They understood the missions, and what it took to perform them. And often the SOF forces had the skills, and were more than willing to partner and share.

There were occasions where we saw some mid- to higher-level leaders that didn’t understand the roles and capabilities of SOF, and would attempt to take control of the SOF units in the area. In one case, a conventional force officer actually tried to break an A-Team into one-man elements to ride along in Bradley fighting vehicles! These incidents were more prevalent in the beginning of the war, and as the forces have worked closer together, a trust and understanding has been built that maximized the effects of both forces, as well as the indigenous security forces.

Lastly, I’d say that this is the type of warfare that SOF was designed to fight. People that are hand-picked, highly trained in problem-solving, and out-of-the-box thinking, understand the value of language and culture are critical in this kind of war. Early on, as SOCOM was tasked to write the plan for what was then called the Global War on Terror, we made it clear that the key to success was the indirect piece and not all direct action. That was a hard sell then, but today it is well understood, and as you hear and see the discussions of smart power, I would say that it has great support throughout the government.