Is there a core theme or line of thought that appears to be guiding the present QDR effort? And do you have any sense of the contributions of simulations, wargames, and other assessment tools being used to support the QDR effort?

I have not been briefed or participated in today’s QDR, but from what I have heard and read, it seems to be on the right track. I think for special operations there will continue to be growth in the right areas. One of Secretary [of Defense Robert] Gates’ main themes will be to institutionalize capabilities like counterterrorism and foreign internal defense. Those are designated in the Nunn-Cohen Amendment that built SOCOM as “SOF activities.” So I think again that this direction will be good for SOCOM and SOF, and good for building the type of forces that are needed for a whole-of-government approach to warfighting. Additionally, this will be an opportunity to fix anything that we failed to get correct in 2006, which could include more enabling forces.

I think that true to the mandate of the QDR, you will see changes to meet today’s threat and balance the force for the future. Simulations and wargaming are critical to any force structuring effort. When properly applied, the ability to fight out a scenario, even if only in simulation, will cause the decision makers to react, and when they do so it will expose gaps in capability for examination. While analysis and wargaming can be overdone, it is critical to finding the right balance in forces for the future. Today we are involved in two wars and a global struggle again violent extremism. The requirements are pretty clear. But looking to future adversaries and the requirement to defend America in a future environment is not nearly as obvious, and that is where wargaming and simulation efforts are so valuable.

Given your own experience and thoughts, what are some of the key issues you hope would be examined by DoD in the present QDR effort?

I think that the things I would put up on the wall would be these:

SOF Growth: I think that we want to continue the appropriate growth of the U.S. SOF community. Bigger does not always mean better, so we have to make sure that what the SOF community goes into the QDR to ask for are not “random acts of growth.” It needs to be absolutely studied and designed to meet the requirements that we think we are going to have in front of us in the immediate future. So I think that SOF needs to grow some more, but I would be careful about continuing to add really big numbers of personnel and units to SOCOM.

Conventional Ground Forces Growth: In between the 2006 and present QDRs, you have seen the growth in end-strength of both the Army and Marine Corps, and that is one of the things that I think needs to be studied very carefully. Do we still need to grow more in those services? Everybody acknowledges the tremendous cost of growing ground forces, but quite frankly the operations tempo and personnel tempo on our deployed personnel over the past eight years since 9/11 has been absolutely extreme. If it takes a larger Army and Marine Corps to maintain the level of presence that we are going to need around the world in this persistent conflict, then we need to get it right. I am certain that the CSA [chief of staff of the Army] and the CMC [commandant of the Marine Corps] work this issue every day.

Procurement/Modernization: As far as “big ticket” procurement and modernization items, this is a bit of a troublesome area for me in discussion about the present QDR. Some people think that the words, “balancing the force,” mean we’re going to get rid of all of our capability to go into a major regional contingency, and “balance” to the light or SOF side of force structure. I don’t see it that way. I think that what we need to do is take the analysis, and make sure that the force can do all the things the country reasonably can expect of its Department of Defense, and number one is to defend the nation.

If you will allow me, the full range of capabilities to deal with the full spectrum of threats and possibilities?

Right, and the force has to be balanced to do that. And there are some systems and capabilities that are expensive and that you may not be using every day, but that you have to have when the time comes, and there is no replacement for them. So I don’t want to see us go totally away from forces that allow us to fight the MRCs, to units that only fight in small wars. The point is to get a real balance. There are a large part of our forces in the middle of the spectrum that can play in both kinds of wars, like the 10th Mountain Division up at Fort Drum, N.Y. It does not matter what kind of contingency you have; the 10th Mountain or the 82nd Airborne are going to be deployed there. We have learned again the importance of ground forces, and we need to get the balance between the air, maritime, and heavy, light, and SOF correct. But I see in the press a lot of discussion, some of which would make you believe that “balancing the force” means giving up our heavy forces and moving to small units consisting only of “light” forces, and that is not what I am talking about. “Balance” is across the full spectrum of conflict! Now, some of these types of equipment are very expensive, and this is why it is critical that we get the acquisition numbers right. We don’t need a lot of extra stuff sitting on the shelf with the American taxpayers footing the bill for it.