Driving stability in the program in order to control cost has been the chief thrust of his office, Bogdan said. Accelerating or decelerating aircraft purchases costs more money, a fate he is determined to avoid.

“What I’m looking for in 2019 is a fifth-generation airplane for a fourth-generation price.”

“What I’m looking for in 2019 is a fifth-generation airplane for a fourth-generation price.”

The program is on a path to reach a comparable price, according to Bogdan. He maintains that the unit cost of aircraft decreased 4 percent from lot 4 to lot 5, a bit less than 4 percent for lots 5 to 6, and slightly more than 4 percent for lots 6 to 7. With a flat production rate, the reduction was achieved through increasing efficiencies, not volume. The success is, in part, the result of getting commitments to lower costs from Lockheed, Pratt & Whitney, and Northrop Grumman “at the CEO level,” Bogdan added.

The trend reflects what the JPO’s chief called a much better mutual relationship. In 2012, he called the JSF program culture the “worst I’ve ever seen.” A year later, Bogdan acknowledged there were still pockets of dysfunction on both government and contractor sides, but said communication and goodwill are much improved. As proof, he offered the fact that the two most recent production lot contracts (LRIP 6 and 7) were negotiated in about eight months. The previous single lot took 14 months to agree on. The JPO is embarking on the same path with Pratt & Whitney for lots 7 and 8 of F135 production.

Risk sharing has become more balanced too. For lots 6 and 7, the government will assume no liability for cost overruns. If the aircraft come in at less than the negotiated price, the contractors and the government split the savings. Rebalancing risk, Bogdan said, has changed behaviors for the good.

Such behavior includes participating in the JPO’s “cost war room,” a space consuming half a floor of Lockheed Martin’s Global Vision Center near Crystal City, Arlington, Va. Manned by both DoD and contractor cost analysts and supply chain and manufacturing experts, the cost war room systematically looks at the supply chain, brainstorming ideas to reduce cost and facilitating limited looks at each side’s accounting books. The idea was inspired by similar war rooms employed by the Navy’s Virginia-class submarine program and the Eurofighter Consortium’s Typhoon fighter program.

“Transparency” is a watchword that runs through the program and extends to JSF international partners who, Bogdan claimed, will henceforth get more detailed cost information.

“In the past, we couldn’t give them a good answer. All we could say was, ‘We’ll take a look at what it’s going to cost the U.S. and then we’ll try and figure it out. That was good enough way back when. It’s not good enough now.”

Specifically, the program office will meet with each partner, review its operational/use assumptions, and come up with a unique cost model and cost projection for that partner. Better information will help partners finalize (and likely defend) acquisition decisions.

Such projections hinge on getting the F-35 to maturity. To do so, it will have to overcome nagging reliability/maintainability (R&M) problems.

“The R&M numbers we’re seeing are not where we need them to be,” Bogdan said. “There are pieces and parts on this airplane that are simply breaking too much. When they break and we take them off the airplane, getting them repaired takes too long. The good news is, now that we have 8,000 hours and 5,000 sorties under our belt, we have a very good list of all those bad actors. We’re systematically applying engineering discipline, money, and work to try to bring that list down.”

Reliability concerns have not diminished Bogdan’s confidence that the Marines will meet their scheduled 2015 IOC, nor that the USAF will declare IOC in 2016. After that, however, he is less confident based on concurrent software development. Predicting progress years in advance with such a program is challenging at best. Successful development of the interim software that will facilitate Marine Corps and Air Force operations – Blocks 2B and 3I – will heavily influence scheduled delivery of Block 3F. Labs and engineers now at work on 2B/3I will gradually have to shift more effort to Block 3F.

“If that happens in a timely way, I’m more confident in 3F. If I have to leave people and resources on 2B and 3I longer, you can bet that affects our final capability,” Bogdan acknowledged.

Alongside cost, software development is the chief risk to the program, its progress a good indicator of what will happen in 2017. Broader weapons system development, as well as the aforementioned ALIS logistics and maintenance system, will affect schedule and capability as well. Some of that development is “flat out late,” Bogdan conceded. The system’s new helmet, which fuses radar and other sensor data, is an example.

Alongside cost, software development is the chief risk to the program, its progress a good indicator of what will happen in 2017. Broader weapons system development, as well as the aforementioned ALIS logistics and maintenance system, will affect schedule and capability as well. Some of that development is “flat out late,” Bogdan conceded. The system’s new helmet, which fuses radar and other sensor data, is an example.

Designed by Rockwell Collins/Elbit Systems, the primary helmet is due in 2015, but as recently as August, pilots flying at-sea tests on the Wasp reported continued image jitter and data lag problems. In October, however,  the Pentagon announced it was halting development of an alternative helmet and concentrating on fixing the issues.

There was good news from the Wasp test, including accomplishment of the first at-sea night landing by an F-35B. Ship integration test points were met as well, with new deck markings, landing area materials, and lithium battery charging/storage facilities making the grade. Royal Air Force Squadron Leader Jim Schofield became the first international pilot to execute sea-based launch and landing in the F-35B.

“The airplane performed magnificently,” Bodgan enthused, “and if you talk to the pilots, especially guys who used to fly Harriers, they’ll tell you that even flying at night without the sensors, landing the F-35B on deck is easier than landing the Harrier at any time.”

The positive results should buoy decision-making in Britain, which was scheduled to green light or red light the purchase of 14 additional F-35Bs. The other seagoing F-35, the F-35C, was set to receive a redesigned tail hook before heading to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, N.J., for field landing tests.

Fuel-dump problems resulting from the design of the fuel outlet are being mitigated. The under-wing vent location caused fuel to attach to the wing and other airframe areas. Relocating the vent isn’t possible, so engineers are changing the outlet design, the pressure at which fuel is pumped out, and sealing off portions of the rear of the aircraft where fuel could migrate.

The fuel dumping issue is emblematic of where the F-35 program finds itself in 2013.

“My favorite saying of the last few months is: ‘We cannot change what the program did. We can only change what the program does,’” said Bogdan.

This article first appeared in the Defense Fall/Winter 2013-2014 Edition.