In November 2012, we “self-deployed” three V-22s from Okinawa to Guam. When you put V-22s [into a potential] battlespace, you’ve shrunk it in terms of time and distance. And then throw in a tanker now and again so that guy doesn’t actually even have to land, and you can push that airplane over some pretty big distances in that area [the Asia-Pacific region] and distance is what rules in Asia. When you’ve got something like the V-22 that shrinks that distance down, you have a real capability. Our goal was not just to get V-22s to Okinawa. The goal was to get them there and to operate from there. The V-22 is an example of the mobility required to support our [operational] distributed laydown across all of Asia.

 

Unlike some who see the “2012 Defense Strategic Guidance” as an additional burden, you make it sound like the Marine Corps sees opportunities in the new policies.

Well, for the last 10 years our nation has needed, and the situation has demanded, that we serve side by side with our brothers [and sisters] in the Army, in the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan. We don’t fight individually anymore. The joint force now requires that everybody pitch in to defeat whatever threatens the nation. And so for 10 years we have been there. The opportunity here is that we return to our expeditionary roots. This theater [the Asia-Pacific region] is a maritime theater, and thus it’s a naval expeditionary theater. And that’s what the Marine Corps is. We are America’s crisis response force. We are the naval expeditionary force in readiness. Congress in 1952 said, “Marine Corps, thou shalt be most ready when the nation is least ready.” The 82nd Congress put it into law. Congresses since then have overturned a lot of law and changed a lot of things, but they haven’t overturned or changed the fact that the Marine Corps needs to be most ready when the nation is least ready.

This is a great opportunity for the Marine Corps to return to our amphibious roots, and to continue what I think is a great partnership with the greatest Navy in the world, and to be able to provide a capability not only to us, but to partner nations in Asia with naval expeditionary forces.

Naval expeditionary forces are really, really important because we don’t burden host-nation countries. We show up off the coast, we go ashore, we train with you, and we’re done. We’re back out. We’re off doing something else. We don’t have [or want] a big base. If you want us to build a base, well, that’s up to the folks at the State Department and DoD and all that. But in the interim, we’re out there doing what I think is the most critical piece to long-term stability in Asia, which is building partnerships with the nations there. We go over there to create access. You know there’s this big [discussion going on] about “anti-access/area denial.” Well, one of the ways you build access is by being in [the region] before a crisis happens, by understanding the people, cultures, and relationships. And so, there is an opportunity here, but it’s an opportunity to return to our roots, not really to change the Marine Corps as we go to this theater.

We have Marines who were actually in the Philippines doing some preparatory planning in order to execute a training opportunity there. And then they had a natural disaster there. The bottom line was, our folks were down there providing disaster relief because that team instantly switched their hat around from planning for an exercise and partnering with the folks in the Philippines to executing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at that moment with the Filipinos, building a relationship. And it goes back to my point – “virtual presence” is actual absence. We were there when they needed us, not getting on a C-17 somewhere, not sending them something five days later – physically present and building that relationship. And relationships, I think, are going to be the key in this region.

You’ve talked a little bit about how you’re going to draw down four infantry battalions from your current total of 27 to 23. Are there any other formations of note that are going to be added or deleted during this process?

Well, we stood up Marine Corps Forces Central Command as a separate three-star headquarters now. So the commanding general at I MEF is no longer “dual-hatted,” [heading] both I MEF and MARCENT [Marine Corps Forces Central Command]. We now have [Lt.] Gen. [Robert B.] Neller [commanding] at MARCENT, [while Lt.] Gen. [John A.] Toolan, who came out of Afghanistan, leads I MEF. Part of the Force Structure Review was asking where are the critical theaters, where do we need to play in componentcy, what do we need to stand up? So, that second MARCENT headquarters was a key part of that. We’ve reinforced a couple of the MEBs [Marine Expeditionary Brigades], but that’s about it on the command element side.

In terms of the ground combat element, as I said we went down from 27 infantry battalions. We’ll be at 23. We went from 30 artillery batteries down to 23. And we went from 15 light armored reconnaissance companies to 12. In terms of fixed-wing aviation, we’ll be at a total of 18 VMFAs [F/A-18 Hornet fighter/attack squadrons] and VMAs [AV-8B Harrier attack squadrons], so that’s a reduction of two VMFAs and one VMA. And then of course our VMAQs, our EA-6B squadrons, by the end of fiscal year 19 they will all be “sundowned.” The reason is that the JSF [F-35] and some changes in our UAV capabilities will bring a capability such that we won’t need those aircraft. So that’s on the fixed-wing side.

And on the rotary-wing side, we went from 18 VMM/HMMs – you know, either V-22 Osprey or CH-46 Sea Knight squadrons – we went from 18 to 16. And our HMLHs – our heavy helicopter squadrons [CH-53 Sea Stallions] – we went from nine to eight. And HMLAs [AH-1 Super Cobra/Viper and UH-1 Huey/Venom light attack helicopters] nine to eight. So, as you see, a slightly smaller force across the board and across the MAGTF, while still maintaining that Marine Air-Ground Task Force integrity and capability. We [also are] taking some changes and restructuring in the logistics combat element, [including eliminating] one combat logistics battalion. Bridging companies came down a little bit, but we grew some other capabilities, so logistics we stayed strong in, and the rest of our enabler packages we stayed strong in.