As always in the special operations environment, “graduation” is never the end of training. Not far from Hurlburt Field gate is the foreign language study facility presenting Arabic, Spanish, and Tagalog languages among others – all just the next step for the “non-standard futures” awaiting them.
The Future of “Enablement Strategy”
In 2005, USSOCOM Commander Gen. Bryan “Doug” Brown responded to the squadron’s increasing task load by directing a near doubling of the unit’s size. He could well judge that such an expansion would likely prove insufficient beyond the short term. As always, however, limitations were placed on the commander’s options, and therein lay challenges for which resolutions still remain elusive some 13 years after the squadron’s activation.
The fact remains that attempts to further expand today’s combat aviation advisory capabilities encounter a paradox of their own: Reducing the potential for the United States being drawn into the massive political and financial costs inherent with conventional warfare is a stated objective of CAA activities, but the ongoing cost of the Global War on Terrorism is such that it curtails the scarce funds necessary to expand CAA programs.
By virtue of cultural temperament, technological expertise, and massive production capabilities, the American way of war has long focused on the high-tech “direct action” approach to military campaigning. That this approach has worked thus far for America is historically verifiable, and no less importantly, easily quantifiable, but … there’s a catch. Though decisive in facing enemies equipped with similar military forces, it nonetheless faces severe restrictions when applied to the “low-tech” asymmetric form previously described.
While no one seriously contends that FID in and of itself will prevent wars, it is instructive to learn that the 6th SOS budget for FY 2004 and FY 2005 was merely $5.6 million. While accurate figures are difficult to obtain, the financial costs of the war in Iraq alone appears in early-2008 to approximate $2 billion per week.
Former USAFSOS instructor and acknowledged FID expert Dr. Wray R. Johnson highlights other strategic consequences that inevitably extend from insufficient FID-Aviation resources:
Lacking a credible capacity to advise and train foreign air forces in the employment and sustainment of their organic airpower assets reduces the options available to [U.S.] national command authorities and responsible theater combatant commanders. The 6th SOS was designed to fill this gap by deploying politically aware, culturally astute, and foreign language-trained aviation experts … who can recommend appropriate airpower solutions …
American military history plays no small part in the perpetuating of the paradox. By virtue of cultural temperament, technological expertise, and massive production capabilities, the American way of war has long focused on the high-tech “direct action” approach to military campaigning. That this approach has worked thus far for America is historically verifiable, and no less importantly, easily quantifiable, but … there’s a catch. Though decisive in facing enemies equipped with similar military forces, it nonetheless faces severe restrictions when applied to the “low-tech” asymmetric form previously described.
One of the first methodologies to break down in assessing the cost-effectiveness of the “advisory business” is that, much like the psychological operations field, it has traditionally found it difficult to provide the bean counters with quantifiable, measurable proof of results achieved. How, for example, to measure the value of the trust and rapport built between a young 6th SOS officer and his host-nation counterpart as they overcome a difficult situation neither will likely forget?
A more specific example of this problem is provided in a story written in 2006 by Jamie Haig for the online edition of Special Operations Technology. It was during one of the 6th SOS’ deployments to Iraq that a small, single-engine aircraft carrying both a 6th SOS advisor and an Iraqi pilot suffered an engine failure that led to their forced landing on a seemingly remote dirt road. A short time later the grounded airmen observed a large crowd of curious locals approaching from a distance; not a welcome view for either of the two, but potentially lethal once the American pilot was spotted. Quick thinking on the Iraqi’s part hid the American behind a nearby dirt berm while the Arab pilot handled the crowd without incident until rescue helicopters arrived to retrieve the two airmen.
Given the prestigious status of the first Iraqis to restore their Air Force and the pride that goes with such a national institution, it is well within the realm of possibility that the Iraqi pilot may reach senior rank. No less so for the American who has already distinguished himself by virtue of motivation and skill as a CAA airman. How is the bond between these two to be measured in today’s dollars? What might it be worth 20 years from now if they meet again as senior officers in some U.S.-Iraqi combined task force?
Skeptics tempted to dismiss such speculation should keep in mind how little it costs to maintain and even expand one of DOD’s cheapest force-multipliers. It would indeed seem that proponents of FID-Aviation are well-positioned to argue that there is much room left for “affordable growth” in combat aviation advisory units.
This article was first published in The Year in Special Operations: 2008 Edition.