Now the question was: Would the Army arrive too late and would the guerrillas be forced to attack on their own?

Lt. George Skau was the leader of the Provisional Division Reconnaissance Platoon, responsible for the recon portion of the operation. Getting his men and their burden of weapons – which included stocks of ammunition and rocket launchers specifically designed to take out the bunkers – behind enemy lines, linking up with the guerrilla bands, assigning fire teams and their targets, and getting everyone into position without the enemy’s knowledge – an operation that began on Feb. 20 – was a daunting feat. And, in fact, though the teams assigned to mark and secure the paratroop drop zone and amphibious beach reached their assigned locations in time, three teams ultimately arrived to their sites after the fighting started on Feb. 23. Despite some near-miss incidents, first with a Japanese patrol boat and later with Japanese patrols, Skau and his men, the land part of the three-pronged attack, were successful in avoiding enemy contact before H-Hour.

At Nichols Field at 5:30 a.m. on Feb. 23, Ringler and his men began boarding the nine C-47 transports that would carry them to Los Baños. By 6:30 a.m., the last C-47 had lifted off the runway and, in V formation with three planes to a V, the airborne prong of the raid began the 20-minute flight south to Los Baños.

At 5:15 a.m. on Feb. 23, at the American base at Mamatid along the shore of Laguna de Bay, 54 Amtracs containing Burgess and the balance of the battalion, the amphibious prong of the raid, crawled into the dark waters of the lake. In a column of threes, the balance of the battalion headed south toward the landing beach located at San Antonio. At dawn, as they approached the shore, the men in the Amtracs saw the nine C-47s. The transports were flying so low that Amtrac driver Tech. Five Arthur Coleman said he “couldn’t believe that they could jump so low an altitude.”

In the lead C-47 at 6:58 a.m., Ringler spotted green smoke rising from the grenades popped at the landing site by men from the recon platoon. The green jump light went on and Ringler and men leaped out.

The raid was timed for the changing of the guard and when the off-duty Japanese guards would be doing their morning exercises in the open area outside the commandant’s quarters. The timing was virtually perfect. Stunned, unarmed, loincloth-clad guards stopped their calisthenics and for long, precious moments gaped at the descending paratroopers. Then the sounds of small arms fire, Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR), and grenades from the attacking recon units caused the Japanese to bolt for their barracks and weapons. They were too late. Skau and his men had arrived first, and delivered a deadly greeting. Only those Japanese who were able to flee into the hills south of the camp survived. All the guard posts were neutralized in a fierce 20-minute firefight.

The parachute jump was flawless. Japanese troop response was so disorganized that Ringler later said, “I wasn’t aware of any shooting at use from the ground. … If there was any firing, it was very light or the enemy was off target.”