In his letter to Chambliss on June 9, 2009, Corley refused to kowtow to policy. He wrote, “At Air Combat Command we have held the need for 381 F-22s to deliver a tailored package of air superiority to our combatant commanders and provide a potent, globally arrayed, asymmetric deterrent against potential adversaries. In my opinion, a fleet of 187 F-22s puts execution of our current national military strategy at high risk in the near to mid-term [emphasis added].”

Corley added:

“To my knowledge, there are no studies that demonstrate 187 F-22s are adequate to support our national defense strategy. Air Combat Command analysis, done in concert with Headquarters Air Force, shows a moderate risk force can be obtained with an F-22 fleet of approximately 250 aircraft.”

“Of specific concern is the fact that 80% of the F-16s will be gone in eight years and since the majority of the [air defense] mission is accomplished by these F-16s. This will certainly negatively impact the Air National Guard’s ability to execute the [air defense] mission,” Chambliss wrote.

Corley could have been fired or might have chosen to resign for giving his best professional opinion rather than rubber-stamping the policy of the administration. Apparently, however, there was enough blood on the floor for the time being.

 

Wyatt, too

On June 17, 2009, Chambliss wrote to Lieutenant General Henry M. “Bud” Wyatt, director of the Air National Guard, about the air defense mission. Guardsmen were carrying out the bulk of the mission.

Chambliss wrote of his concern that retirement of some aging fighters “will leave the Guard short of the required number of aircraft to execute this mission and that no plan has been developed to fill this shortfall through either modernized legacy aircraft or new aircraft procurements.”

“Of specific concern is the fact that 80% of the F-16s will be gone in eight years and since the majority of the [air defense] mission is accomplished by these F-16s. This will certainly negatively impact the Air National Guard’s ability to execute the [air defense] mission,” Chambliss wrote.

The senator asked for Wyatt’s judgment regarding placing new fifth generation fighters like the F-22 and F-35 in the Guard.

I interviewed Wyatt at the time but did not speak with him when working on this book. It’s unclear whether anyone gave Wyatt instructions to do anything other than reply, which is what would normally be expected. My copy of Wyatt’s reply is not dated. It begins with a reference to the nation’s highest strategic priority: “defending the Homeland [emphasis Wyatt’s].”

Wrote Wyatt: “While a variety of solutions abound, I believe the nature of the current and future asymmetric threats to our nation, particularly from seaborne cruise missiles, requires a fighter platform with the requisite speed and detection to address them. The F-22’s unique capability in this arena enables it to handle a full spectrum of threats that the [Air National Guard’s] current legacy systems are not capable of addressing. I am fond of saying that ‘America’s most important job should be handled by America’s best fighter.'”

Wyatt acknowledged budget and force-structure issues. Using italics as shown here, Wyatt wrote that, “Many will say this means making tough choices, but I believe we can maintain our vitality by making smart choices.” He concluded, “Basing F-22s (and eventually F-35s) at strategic [Guard] locations throughout the United States while simultaneously making them available to rotationally support worldwide contingency operations is the most responsible approach to satisfying all of our nation’s needs.”

Chambliss had now heard from two key air power leaders who’d gone on record as saying the nation needed more F-22s than Obama, Gates, or the administration would support.