In the wake of sequestration in late March, Hostage made the difficult decision to ground 17 squadrons in order to preserve combat readiness in the remaining force. He explains that he could have kept the entire squadron complement flying, but at ludicrously low rates that would have left pilots marginally safe-for-flight, let alone combat ready.
“It’s a moral imperative that we only send units to war if they’re fully trained and fully equipped. I believe it’s morally corrupt to send somebody who is not fully qualified or capable into combat.”
To illustrate, Hostage cited a quip made by USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh last July: “Upgrading the existing fleet may save money, but it won’t make it competitive. A fourth-generation aircraft meeting a fifth-generation aircraft in combat will be more cost-efficient, but it will be dead before it ever knows it’s in a fight.”
ACC got those squadrons flying again in July, but only by receiving permission from the Pentagon to use funds ($211 million) it had earmarked for procurement and investment to fund readiness. It did not receive money; it merely shifted what was on hand. The effects on readiness were still apparent in September.
During the grounding, aircraft received no maintenance due to lack of money for spares. They sat, and like idled cars, they had problems when fired up again. Flying to regain proficiency started with experienced pilots, who constitute about 40 percent of the average squadron’s aircrew. Only when they were again safe to fly could experienced pilots begin taking junior pilots aloft and getting them safe-for-flight. Then both groups had to regain combat proficiency. Hostage said he expected to have the units combat ready by mid-October. In the meantime, U.S. forces and interests were at elevated risk.
Contrary to the past decade, America’s future adversaries will contest airspace by asymmetric and symmetric means, Hostage said. USAF aircrews already must train to deal with momentary or prolonged interruption of the linked/satellite-enabled capabilities upon which precision strike relies. Russian and Chinese weapons makers are selling fifth generation (or near fifth-gen) fighters to more than 50 countries. The Air Force’s front-line F-15Cs and Block 50 F-16s are not a match for them. To illustrate, Hostage cited a quip made by USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh last July: “Upgrading the existing fleet may save money, but it won’t make it competitive. A fourth-generation aircraft meeting a fifth-generation aircraft in combat will be more cost-efficient, but it will be dead before it ever knows it’s in a fight.”
“The programmed purchase of 1,763 Air Force F-35s is not a luxury,” Hostage said. “It’s a national security imperative… Another tiny fleet is not what we need.”
The threat means that maintaining and upgrading the F-22 fleet is essential. The Raptor fleet allows the Air Force initiative in sophisticated anti-access/area denial scenarios “despite its pitifully small numbers” Hostage said. Such capability enables the joint force to conduct offense and provides protection for the ISR assets it is so reliant on. Ensuring that capability in contested environments rests squarely on getting the F-35A.
“The programmed purchase of 1,763 Air Force F-35s is not a luxury,” Hostage said. “It’s a national security imperative… Another tiny fleet is not what we need.”
Ensuring that mandate will likely mean axing other assets to free up funding. The “vertical cuts” that the Air Force has been discussing since last spring are painful but real choices, according to Hostage. If the USAF leaders are allowed to make the decisions, the A-10, KC-10, and HH-60G (which Hostage calls “worn to hell”) fleets would likely be retired.
“I’ve said it, the Chief has said it. The only way you really save money is to make entire weapons systems go away.”
Hostage’s forthright answers regarding the possibility of eliminating entire weapons systems demonstrated both a discomfort with the necessity to do so and a determination to recommend the cuts to preserve essential combat power. They will be made if politics and Congress do not preclude them.
If opting for recapitalization without modernization is the only choice the Air Force has due to the budget, we must hope the F-35 is as good as advertised, Hostage said without humor.
“If we burn the bridge behind us on the fourth-generation [fleet] because of this short term fiscal crush and we don’t get to where we have to with the F-35, we’re in deep doo doo.”