A short battle, lasting only a few days, Midway’s influence was out of all proportion to its length. Like the Battle of Britain, Midway was a major turning point in the war, but also important for the irreversible changes it heralded in naval warfare.

The Battle of the Coral Sea weeks before had been notable as the first clash of battle fleets conducted entirely through aircraft, without the ships of either opposing fleet ever making contact with each other. The U.S. Navy had lost the fleet carrier Lexington, fleet oiler Neosho, and destroyer Sims. The fleet carrier Yorktown was also heavily damaged. Needless to say, most of the Pacific Fleet’s battleships were being repaired and salvaged after being sunk at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese lost the light carrier Shoho sunk, plus a cruiser and assorted minesweepers and smaller craft. More importantly, the Japanese fleet carrier Zuikaku was heavily damaged and would be laid up for months, and her sister Shokaku, though undamaged, had lost most of her air group. The two Japanese carriers each could carry 84 aircraft, but at the end of the battle only 39 survived. Coral Sea can be argued to have ended as a tactical victory for the Japanese and a strategic victory for the Allies. While both sides were bloodied, the intent of the operation for the Japanese, an invasion of Port Moresby, was called off because they no longer had enough aircraft to cover their planned landing.

Midway, however, saw a few aircraft arguably turn the tide of war in the Pacific, showing that the airplane could inflict damage far in excess of its cost relative to a battleship.

Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the Midway operation, had developed a typically complicated plan for the invasion of Midway atoll.  Unfortunately for him and for the Japanese fleet, much of his plan depended on surprise, and, unknown to him, surprise had already been lost.

Through the brilliant codebreaking achievements of Lt. Cmdr. Joseph J. Rochefort and Station Hypo, the American carriers Enterprise, Hornet, and the patched-up Yorktown were waiting in ambush at the aptly named Point Luck off Midway when the Japanese fleet arrived. Rear Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher, in overall command, flew his flag from Yorktown, centerpiece of Task Force 17. Task Force 16, comprising Enterprise and Hornet, was commanded by Rear Adm. Raymond Spruance.

Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the Midway operation, had developed a typically complicated plan for the invasion of Midway atoll.  Unfortunately for him and for the Japanese fleet, much of his plan depended on surprise, and, unknown to him, surprise had already been lost.

Even so, the odds seemed dauntingly against the U.S. Navy. Yamamoto’s forces included four fleet and two light carriers, 11 battleships, 22 cruisers, 65 destroyers and approximately 20 submarines. Against this Nimitz could muster only his three carriers, one light and 7 heavy cruisers, 17 destroyers and 12 submarines. However, Yamamoto had divided this fleet into several separate task forces (with several separate tasks) instead of concentrating his forces. In addition, the Americans had the advantage of an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the shape of Midway itself.

Adm. Chuichi Nagumo, in operational command of the four Japanese carriers of Kido Butai, launched his first strike on Midway, simultaneously with a group of scout planes to search for any enemy carriers, early on the morning of June 4, 1942. But two of those cruiser scouts, from Tone, would be launched late, and it would be one of them that would discover part of the American fleet.

Though Nagumo had been ordered by Yamamoto to hold half his planes back – armed with torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs – for an attack on any American carriers, the leader of his returning strike radioed that they had met an unexpected level of resistance and another strike would be needed to subdue Midway. At approximately 0715 Nagumo decided to rearm those reserve aircraft for a second strike against Midway. This meant removing torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs from the aircraft and loading ordnance more effective against ground targets.

In the meantime, the island had launched a series of airstrikes of its own – from Air Force B-17s and torpedo-carrying B-26s to Marine SBD Dauntlesses and obsolescent SB2U Vindicators – against Nagumo’s carriers. While the strikes had achieved no damage against Kido Butai, they had been pressed home with determination, and had kept the combat air patrols of Zeroes busy and the carriers maneuvering to avoid the attacks. This slowed the intricate work of rearming aircraft in the hangar decks, and kept the carriers from being able to head into wind for much longer than it took to recover and recycle their CAP aircraft. Rearming a full deckload strike of aircraft could take up to an hour and a half even under ideal conditions, and spotting the aircraft on deck could take another 45 minutes or more, as the Type 99 Aichi D3A “Vals” were bombed-up on the flight deck itself. On top of this, the Zeroes in the combat air patrol (CAP) had to be refueled and rearmed after engaging the American aircraft attacking from Midway, and more launched in order to keep an umbrella of air cover over the fleet.

Meanwhile, the Japanese aircraft that had flown the first strike on Midway, low on fuel, some damaged and with wounded aboard, would soon need to land and be struck below to the hangar decks to be refueled and rearmed.

At approximately 0745 Nagumo received the message that Tone‘s scout plane reported sighting an American fleet. Shocked, he now reversed the order to rearm his planes for a second strike on Midway. The Nakajima Type 97 B5N “Kate” torpedo bombers were to be reloaded with torpedoes and the Val dive bombers with armor-piercing bombs for use against ships. Some of his advisers urged an immediate strike on the American fleet with whatever weapons were already hung on the aircraft. He decided instead to land and refuel his CAP aircraft as well as his returning strike aircraft while the rearming was being done, and to launch one big strike assembled from all his carriers.

Many have questioned this decision, but it should be kept in mind that, according to research done by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully for their book Shattered Sword, it would have been difficult if not impossible to spot an immediate strike on deck, because at the same time that force would have been spotted, three different forces of American aircraft attacked Nagumo’s carriers. In any case, in the mad rush to rearm, torpedoes, bombs and ammunition were left on the hangar decks, and aircraft were also being fueled. At 0820 Tone‘s scout radioed that it had spotted an American carrier. Nagumo’s decision had already been made, and anyway rearming was proceeding, and the returning strike aircraft had all landed by 0920. However, it would take time to finish the rearming already underway, rearm the newly recovered strike aircraft, move them up to the flight decks, and spot them for launch.

It would take time Nagumo no longer had.

Even if Nagumo had chosen to launch his aircraft with whatever weapons they had on hand, even if he had launched them before landing his returning strike aircraft, the American carrier squadrons were going to get their attacks in first.

While the Japanese carriers worked to finish arming, fueling, and preparing to move their strike to the flight decks, 151 American aircraft were shortly to arrive above the Japanese fleet.  Even if Nagumo had chosen to launch his aircraft with whatever weapons they had on hand, even if he had launched them before landing his returning strike aircraft, the American carrier squadrons were going to get their attacks in first.

Between 0700 and 0755, Spruance’s Enterprise and Hornet had begun launching aircraft at extreme range, hoping to catch the Japanese in exactly the position they had found themselves. At this range, the squadrons did not have enough fuel to circle around and form up properly for coordinated strikes, and individual squadrons departed on individual courses to seek out the Japanese fleet. Aboard Yorktown, Fletcher launched later, between 0838 and 0906, and managed to send a more coordinated strike.

Coordination was important because it split the defenders. This was especially important to the torpedo squadrons flying the obsolescent Douglas TBD Devastators. Lt. Cmdr. John C. Waldron’s Torpedo 8 was the only squadron from Hornet to find the enemy that day, but it found the carriers first, around 0920, just as the last of Nagumo’s Midway strike aircraft were trapping aboard.

Waldron was under no illusions as to VT-8’s chances without fighter escort, and even before launching told his pilots that if only one of them was left, he expected that pilot to get a hit. The TBDs came in low and slow, locked into their runs just above the wavetops as the combat air patrol of Zeros scythed into them and every gun in the Japanese fleet that could bear opened up. The Zeros came in again and again, the backseaters’ guns chattering, the waves ahead torn into spray by the stream of shells being fired against them, and one by one the Devastators went in, too low to bail out and too fast to ditch, the hits sounding like rocks thrown against a tin roof and then the hard, cold sea rushing up. Only a few dropped their torpedoes, none of them scored hits, and only one pilot, Ensign George Gay, survived.

Rearming and refueling proceeded as quickly as was possible aboard the Japanese carriers as they heeled over into sharp evasive turns to avoid the attacks, but soon Lt. Cmdr. Eugene E. Lindsey’s Torpedo 6 arrived and steadied into their runs. This time seven managed to drop their “fish,” but again they got no hits, and only four aircraft survived to recover aboard Enterprise. Even as the carriers recovered from this attack, Lt. Cmdr. Lance E. Massey’s Torpedo 3 bore in. This time Cmdr. John S. Thach’s Wildcats were there to take on the CAP of Zeros, but they were vastly outnumbered, and enough Zeros remained to cut the TBDs to pieces. Five of Torpron 3’s Devastators launched, all missed, two returned to their carrier. All three torpedo squadrons had taken devastating losses and failed to make a single effective hit. But it was somewhere in the middle of Torpedo 3’s attack that the Dauntless dive-bombers arrived.

Above the Japanese fleet, Enterprise‘s VS-6, commanded by Lt. Earl Gallaher, and VB-6, commanded by Lt. Richard “Dick” Best, prepared to follow Air Group Commander Lt. Cmdr. Wade McClusky down in an attack on the Kaga. At the last minute, Best realized all of Enterprise’s SBDs were diving on Kaga and led his two wingmen down on Akagi instead. At nearly the same time, Lt. Cmdr. Maxwell F. Leslie’s VB-3 Dauntlesses from Yorktown arrived from a different direction, and they fell upon Soryu. Hiryu, already under attack by VT-3, was spared for the moment. The uncoordinated attacks had somehow, in one moment, become beautifully coordinated.

A lookout aboard Kaga looked up and saw SBDs wing over into their dives like a fan unfolding, and the big carrier was quickly hit with four bombs. Akagi apparently took a single 1000-pound bomb in the middle of the flight deck, and Soryu three. Fully armed, fueled, and bombed up aircraft exploded in the hangar decks and fed the fires. In five short minutes, what had seemed certain victory turned to ashes. The surviving Hiryu managed to launch attacks that eventually, with the help of submarine I-168‘s torpedo attack, sank Yorktown. Aircraft from Enterprise and Yorktown, however, found and sank her in return, to essentially end the battle. The U.S. Navy, forced by the Japanese to complete the transition from battleships to carriers as its primary capital ships, had in turn dealt a stunning defeat to the Japanese carrier air arm.

Some argue that Guadalcanal and the Solomons campaign did more to attrite the Japanese naval air arm, and there is merit in that analysis. Guadalcanal was also the first time Japan had lost territory. Significantly, Guadalcanal and every battle that followed Midway was defensive in nature. Never again would Japan take to the offensive to expand its territory. At Midway, the Japanese tide reached its high water mark and began to recede.