No such assessments existed. No assessment of the 183 figure existed. It was simply the smallest numbers of F-22s that would be built in production were halted immediately.

The writers acknowledged that the Air Force “previously drew a different conclusion: that 381 aircraft would be required for a low-risk force of F-22s. We revisited this conclusion after arriving in office last summer and concluded that 243 aircraft would be a moderate-risk force. Since then, additional factors have arisen [emphasis added].

According to Corley the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General James E. Cartwright, had testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that “a recently completed DOD study” – referring to the Department of Defense – concluded that 187 Raptors was a sufficient number. “This was one of several references to studies that never existed,” Corley said.

No such additional factors had arisen and none are named in the op-ed piece. Only one thing happened: Gates decided to end production. There were no studies, no assessments, and no “additional factors” about a decision that undermined and weakened the long-range, land-based air power that was the linchpin of the nation’s defense.

The Air Force leaders “revisited” the subject not for any substantive reason but because the service was seeking to save the aircraft it needed in the face of Gates’ opposition.

It needs to be said again that all calculations on all sides of this issue relied on the F-35 being available, reliable and effective. When this op-ed was written, everyone involved was certain operational squadrons of F-35s would be on airfield ramps by 2013 or 2014. It didn’t happen and we aren’t even close.

 

The Corley letter

Not ready to accept the inevitable – not yet – Senator Saxby Chambliss, Republican of Georgia, wanted to push for the F-22.

The story behind an exchange between Chambliss and Corley – as told by Corley for this book – is a Washington primer on politics, patriotism, and an officer’s duty.

Chambliss and Corley, of course, knew each other. Each knew the other was a staunch advocate of the F-22. Probably without any genuine purpose of seeking new facts but in a last-gasp hope of keeping the F-22 alive, Chambliss sent Corley a June 8, 2009 letter requesting Corley’s views – as Air Combat Command boss and a key decision maker – on the F-22.

Chambliss requested, among other things, “Your personal and/or professional assessment of the risk (low/medium/high) of procuring no more than 187 F-22s and your rationale for that assessment.” Chambliss asked about “studies or analysis that support procuring only 187 F-22s.” He implied that such studies might not even exist. And, of course, they did not.

“Schwartz asked me not to reply to Chambliss,” Corley told me. “I was told not to respond and instead to refer the request to [the congressional liaison office]. But Chambliss’s request was not sent to anyone else. It was sent to me. I replied.” Corley wanted the senator to know “why 381 had been our number of a long period of time.”

In a nation where military leaders report to elected civilian officials, Corley was morally and legally bound to provide his best professional opinion. He felt that not responding – that is, following an order – would have been a violation of his oath to the Constitution.

According to Corley the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General James E. Cartwright, had testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that “a recently completed DOD study” – referring to the Department of Defense – concluded that 187 Raptors was a sufficient number. “This was one of several references to studies that never existed,” Corley said.

During this period, several others in the Pentagon who supported Gates’ decision referred to analyses and studies that were never conducted.